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This report outlines a design methodology and provides a recommendation for an 
alternative fleet architecture to the United States naval force for 2030–2035. While there 
are many methods and techniques to generate future fleet alternatives, Set-Based Design 
(SBD) is used in this report to generate a future fleet architecture. SBD principles 
maintain multiple requirements and leave design options open late into the development 
cycle without committing to any specific designs. The purpose of leaving multiple design 
options open until the very end is to reduce the amount of rework and cost overruns if 
requirements change. As the design timeline concludes, SBD uses empirical data to 
collapse focus to the final design solution. 
To implement SBD in this report, the team developed a computer model to 
optimize ship and platform choices simultaneously across eight critical warfare areas 
based on multiple user defined inputs. This theoretical “optimized fleet” is measured 
against unique measures of effectiveness to verify its validity for future operations. This 
method of analysis proposes a future fleet architecture consisting of 297 fighting ships, 
88 Military Sealift Command ships, and 566 unmanned vehicles.  
   
 
 vi 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
   
 
 vii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................1 
A. BACKGROUND ........................................................................................1 
B. TASKING STATEMENT .........................................................................2 
C. PROBLEM STATEMENT .......................................................................2 
II. FLEET ARCHITECTURE AND FLEET DESIGN ...........................................5 
A. DEFINITION OF FLEET DESIGN ........................................................5 
B. DEFINITION OF FLEET ARCHITECTURE .......................................5 
C. FLEET DESIGN DEFINITIONS .............................................................6 
D. REQUIREMENTS DEVELOPMENT AND DECOMPOSITION .......6 
III. SET-BASED DESIGN .........................................................................................11 
A. EXPLANATION OF SET-BASED DESIGN ........................................11 
B. SET-BASED DESIGN VS. POINT BASED DESIGN..........................12 
C. SET-BASED DESIGN APPLIED TO THE FLEET 
ARCHITECTURE ...................................................................................13 
D. SET DESCRIPTIONS .............................................................................14 
IV. MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS .................................................................19 
A. MOE 1 – DOMAIN GRID FACTOR.....................................................20 
B. MOE 2 – CUMULATIVE DETERRENCE COVERAGE ..................21 
C. MOE 3 – WEAPON DENSITY ..............................................................23 
D. MOE 4 – CUMULATIVE POWER PROJECTION ............................25 
E. MOE 5 – FLEET FLEXIBILITY ...........................................................27 
F. MEASURES OF PERFORMANCE ......................................................28 
V. OPTIMIZING A FLEET ....................................................................................31 
A. INTRODUCTION....................................................................................31 
B. CONSTRAINTS .......................................................................................33 
VI. RESULTS .............................................................................................................37 
A. SET-BASED DESIGN RESULTS ..........................................................37 
B. RESULTANT MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS ...........................53 
VII. UNMANNED SYSTEMS ....................................................................................55 
A. COST AND FLEET CAPABILITIES ANALYSIS GIVEN THE 
ADDITION OF UNMANNED SYSTEMS ............................................55 
viii 
VIII. THE FLEET ARCHITECTURE .......................................................................59
A. NUMBER OF TOTAL VESSELS ..........................................................59 
B. NUMBER OF MANNED VEHICLES...................................................59 
C. NUMBER OF UNMANNED VEHICLES .............................................59 
D. ACTIVITIES OF SHIP LIFE CYCLES................................................59 
IX. CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................63
A. SUMMARY ..............................................................................................63 
B. THE FINAL FLEET ARCHITECTURE ..............................................63 
C. ANALYSIS OF MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS .........................66 
D. TECHNICAL RISKS WITH THE FINAL FLEET 
ARCHITECTURE ...................................................................................67 
E. FURTHER RESEARCH AREAS ..........................................................67 
F. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................67 
APPENDIX A.  WARFARE POINTS ...........................................................................69 
APPENDIX  B. CARRIER STRIKE GROUPS (CSG) ................................................75 
APPENDIX C.  AMPHIBIOUS READY GROUP (ARG)...........................................77 
APPENDIX D.  LIGHT CARRIER GROUP (CLG) CONCEPT ...............................79 
APPENDIX E.  UNMANNED UNDERWATER GROUP (UUG) CONCEPT..........81 
APPENDIX F.  BATTLESHIP BATTLE GROUP CONCEPT ..................................83 
APPENDIX G.  DOD UAV CLASSIFICATION ..........................................................85 
APPENDIX H.  LCS FUTURE MISSION MODULE CONSIDERATIONS IN 
SBD ........................................................................................................................87 
APPENDIX I.  MEDIUM DISPLACEMENT UNMANNED SURFACE 
VESSEL MDUSV FUTURE CONSIDERATIONS IN SBD............................89 
APPENDIX J.  TERN FUTURE CONSIDERATIONS IN SBD .................................91 
APPENDIX K.  XLDUUV FUTURE CONSIDERATIONS IN SBD..........................93 
APPENDIX L.  ADDITIONAL BUDGETARY CONSIDERATIONS ......................95 
   
 
 ix 
APPENDIX M.  STAKEHOLDER QUESTIONNAIRE .............................................97 
APPENDIX N.  AREA CALCULATIONS .................................................................101 
APPENDIX O.  SHIP LIFE-CYCLE CONSIDERATIONS .....................................105 
LIST OF REFERENCES ..............................................................................................121 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST .................................................................................125 
 
  
   
 
 x 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
   
 
 xi 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1. Concept of Set-Based Design ..................................................................12 
Figure 2. Comparison of Set-Based Design and Point-Based Design. Source: 
Singer, Doerry, and Buckley (2009). .........................................................13 
Figure 3. Visual Representation of Domain Grid Factor ..........................................21 
Figure 4. Weapon Density Contribution ...................................................................25 
Figure 5. STW Feasibility Region .............................................................................38 
Figure 6. AAW Feasibility Region............................................................................39 
Figure 7. SUW Feasibility Region ............................................................................40 
Figure 8. ASW Feasibility Region ............................................................................41 
Figure 9. EW Feasibility Region ...............................................................................42 
Figure 10. MIW Feasibility Region ............................................................................43 
Figure 11. AMW Feasibility Region ...........................................................................44 
Figure 12. BMD Feasibility Region ............................................................................45 
Figure 13. Fleet Capability Chart ................................................................................48 
Figure 14. 6,676 STW Targets per 24 Hours ..............................................................49 
Figure 15. 4,636 AAW Targets per 24 Hours .............................................................49 
Figure 16. 7,645 SUW Targets per 24 Hours ..............................................................50 
Figure 17. 4,241 ASW Targets per 24 Hours ..............................................................50 
Figure 18. 451 Electronic-Attack Capable Assets.......................................................51 
Figure 19. 288 Mines Cleared per 24 Hours ...............................................................51 
Figure 20. 20 MEUs Delivered ...................................................................................52 
Figure 21. 3,318 Targets per 24 Hours ........................................................................52 
Figure 22. Fleet Capabilities W/O UxVs ....................................................................56 
   
 
 xii 
Figure 23. Fleet Capabilities with UxVs .....................................................................56 
Figure 24. Numbers and Cost of UxVs .......................................................................57 
Figure 25. a) Fleet W/O UxVs b) Fleet with UxVs.....................................................58 
Figure 26. Current Optimized Fleet Response Plan (OFRP): Number of Months 
for Each Activity in a Training and Deployment Cycle. Source: U.S. 
Fleet Forces Command (2014)...................................................................60 
Figure 27. Proposed IOFRP Showing Number of Months in Deployment and 
Training Cycle ...........................................................................................61 
Figure 28. Fleet Forces AOR. Source: Google Maps (2017) ....................................101 
Figure 29. 4th Fleet AOR, South America. Source: Google Maps (2017). ...............102 
Figure 30. 5th Fleet AOR, Arabian Gulf. Source: Google Maps (2017). ..................102 
Figure 31. 5th Fleet AOR, Gulf of Oman. Source: Google Maps (2017). .................103 
Figure 32. 6th Fleet AOR, Mediterranean Sea. Source: Google Maps (2017). .........103 
Figure 33. 7th Fleet AOR, South China Sea. Source: Google Maps (2017). .............104 
 
xiii 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1. Requirement Traceability from A Design for Maintaining Maritime 
Superiority. Adapted from Department of the Navy (2016). .......................7 
Table 2. Requirement Traceability from A Cooperative Strategy for 21st 
Century Seapower. Adapted from Department of the Navy (2015). ...........9 
Table 3. NOTIONAL MOPs Example ....................................................................31 
Table 4. Total SCN Budget Accounting. Source: Assistant Secretary of the 
Navy Finance and Comptroller (2017) ......................................................37 
Table 5. 2035 Platform Allocation with UxVs .......................................................46 
Table 6. 2035 Platform Allocation with UxVs (Repeated) .....................................65 
Table 7. DOD UAV Classification. Adapted from U.S. Army UAS Center for 
Excellence (2010)......................................................................................85 
Table 8. Commissioning and Decommissioning Dates of U.S. Navy Ships. 
Red Implies Scheduled Decommissioning Prior to 2035. Source: 
Naval Vessel Register (2017). .................................................................105 
Table 9. U.S. Navy Ships Under Construction or Planned. Source: Naval 
Vessel Register (2017). ............................................................................119 
   
 
 xiv 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
   
 
 xv 
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
A2AD anti-access area denial 
AAA anti-aircraft artillery 
AAW anti-air warfare 
ACTUV anti-submarine warfare continuous trail unmanned vessel 
AF amphibious force 
AFSB afloat forward staging base 
AGER technical research and spy ship 
AOR area of operation 
AMW amphibious warfare 
ARG amphibious ready group 
ASCM anti-ship cruise missile 
ASROC anti-submarine rockets 
AS submarine tender 
ASW anti-submarine warfare 
ATS towing salvage and rescue ship 
B billion 
BBG battleship battle group 
BMD ballistic missile defense 
C5I command computers communications control and collaborations 
intelligence 
C&D command and decision 
CAP capability 
CLG light carrier group 
CG guided missile cruiser 
COCOM combatant commander 
COTS commercial off-the-shelf 
CRUDES cruiser-destroyer 
CSBA Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments 
CSG carrier strike group 
CVL aircraft carrier, light 
   
 
 xvi 
CVN aircraft carrier, nuclear 
CVW carrier air wing 
DDG guided missile destroyer 
DDG-1000 Zumwalt class guided missile destroyer 
DOD Department of Defense 
DON Department of the Navy 
EEZ exclusive economic zone 
ER extended range 
EPF expeditionary fast transport 
ESB expeditionary sea base 
ESD expeditionary sea dock 
ESG expeditionary strike group 
EW electronic warfare 
FAC fast attack craft 
FIAC fast inshore attack craft 
FDNF forward deployed naval force 
FRP fleet response plan 
FY fiscal year 
HCU helicopter combat squadron 
HP horsepower 
HSC helicopter sea combat squadron 
HSM helicopter maritime strike squadron 
HSU unmanned helicopter combat squadron 
IAMD integrated air missile defense 
ICAV inspections, certifications, assessments, and visits 
ICBM inter-continental ballistic missile 
IJN Imperial Japanese Navy 
IOFRP improved optimal fleet response plan 
IRIN Islamic Republic of Iran, Navy 
ISIS Islamic State of Iraq and Syria 
ISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 
KPN People’s Republic of North Korea Navy 
   
 
 xvii 
LCAC landing craft air cushion 
LCS littoral combat ship 
LCU landing craft, utility 
LHA landing helicopter amphibious assault ship 
LHD landing helicopter deck amphibious assault ship 
LSD dock landing ship 
LPD amphibious transport dock 
MCM mine countermeasure ship 
MDUSV medium displacement unmanned surface vessel 
MEU marine expeditionary unit 
MIW mine warfare 
M million 
MM mission modules 
MOE measures of effectiveness 
MOP measure of performance 
MP mission package 
MSC Military Sealift-Command 
NM nautical mile 
NPS Naval Postgraduate School 
NSFS naval surface fire support 
NWDC Navy Warfare Development Command 
OFRP optimized fleet response plan 
OPNAV Office of the Chief of Naval Operations 
PC patrol boat 
PBD point-based design 
PLAN People’s Liberation Army Navy (Chinese Navy) 
SCN shipbuilding and conversion, Navy 
SEA Systems Engineering and Analysis 
SBD set-based design 
SSC ship-to-shore connector 
SSBN ballistic missile submarine, nuclear 
SSGN conventional missile submarine, nuclear 
   
 
 xviii 
SSN fast attack submarine, nuclear 
STW strike warfare 
SUW surface warfare 
T-AO fleet replenishment oiler 
T-AOE fast combat support ship 
TERN tactically exploited reconnaissance node 
THAAD terminal high-altitude area defense 
TLAM tomahawk land attack cruise missile 
TY then year 
UAS unmanned aerial system 
UAV unmanned aerial vehicle 
USFF United State Fleet Forces 
USPACFLT United States Pacific Fleet 
USV unmanned surface vessel 
UUV unmanned underwater vessel 
UxV unmanned systems 
VAQ electronic attack squadron 
VAW airborne early warning squadron 
VCU unmanned communications relay squadron 
VFA strike fighter squadron 
VFU unmanned strike fighter squadron 
VQU unmanned electronic attack squadron 
VRC fleet logistics support squadron 
VTOL vertical takeoff and landing  
VWU unmanned airborne early warning squadron 
WWI World War One 
XLDUUV extra-large displacement unmanned underwater vehicle 
  




This report describes the application of set-based-design (SBD) to develop a U.S. 
Navy fleet architecture for the 2030–2035 timeframe. Quantifying the effectiveness of a 
navy’s fleet is no easy task. Metrics to quantify the fleet were derived from the following 
two documents: A Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority and A Cooperative 
Strategy for 21st Century Seapower. Along with the two major source documents, other 
Congress-mandated studies on future fleet architectures add to the dynamic and depth of 
analysis in the Systems Engineering and Analysis Cohort 26 (SEA-26) capstone project.  
While the majority of the previous studies on this topic highlight specific points 
of concern for the U.S. Navy’s future, this capstone focuses on a flexible fleet that can 
withstand multiple possible adversaries while reaching, and hopefully exceeding, a 
minimum level of warfare capabilities across eight naval warfare areas (strike warfare 
[STW], anti-air warfare [AAW], surface warfare [SUW], anti-submarine warfare [ASW], 
ballistic missile defense [BMD], electronic warfare [EW], mine warfare [MIW], and 
amphibious warfare [AMW]). 
The team derived quantitative requirements from guiding principles articulated in 
the source documents to generate different emphases on the future of the U.S. Navy to 
include, but are not limited to, geographical, adversarial, and warfare-focused emphases. 
These different emphases define the “sets” in this study’s SBD. Specific examples of sets 
include a sea-control focused navy, a sea-control focused navy with unmanned systems, a 
BMD along with STW-focused navy, and a non–blue water navy emphasis. Using 
measures of performance (MOP), the sets contribute bounds to a feasibility region for 
each of the Navy’s eight primary warfare areas. Each feasible region bounds possible 
data points quantifying the MOP for each warfare area given an associated monetary 
value. An optimization model developed for this study serves as a tool that selects a 
specific list of platforms by keeping the data points within their respective feasibility 
regions across all eight warfare areas. This tool comprises a spreadsheet consisting of 
quantitative assumptions, stakeholder-based input, set-defined constraints, and equations 
calculating the various measures for this study. Given our assumptions and constraints, 
   
 
 xx 
the optimization model generates a future fleet architecture consisting of 297 fighting 
ships and 586 unmanned systems as outlined in Table 5 of the full report. This solution 
yields 9 carrier strike groups (CSGs), 4 DDG-1000 battle groups, 9 light carrier groups 
(CLGs), 12 amphibious ready groups (ARGs), 4 mine countermeasure (MCM) 
squadrons, and 6 littoral surface action groups (SAGs). 
The main budget constraint for this study is a $257B (FY2035) shipbuilding and 
conversion Navy (SCN) budget. However, only fighting platforms are considered for this 
study; outfitting, overhaul, refueling, support ships, and port facilities ships all contribute 
to the reduction in budget, yielding a $164B (FY2035) budget constraint for the 
optimization model. Other fleet accounts supporting aircraft procurement, manpower, and 
maintenance may be added as future constraints. 
The implementation of unmanned systems in the 2035 fleet increases the MOPs 
by 19% at a cost of $5.7B. This $5.7 billion cost is not considered an SCN expense, and 
does not result in an additional monetary expense within our model. This, too, is an 
additional constraint for future research. 
Principles from the source documents guide the development of five measures of 
effectiveness (MOE) to assess the capabilities of the generated fleet architecture, and 
allocation of platforms across the numbered fleets allows for maximization of MOEs. 
The current-day (2017) platform allocation serves as a basis for 2035 platform 
distribution, as we use the current force as the starting point. Manual distribution of the 
platforms allows users of the tool to keep human decision-makers involved in 
maximizing MOEs. 
SBD is an effective and unique tool upfront in the design process, however 
cumbersome and difficult when considering complex problems such as designing a future 
naval fleet architecture. SBD pairs well with optimization methods by restricting the 
multidimensional feasible region. The use of SBD in this study lead the results that shift 
the fleet focus away from undersea warfare platforms and the idea of a high value  
unit-centric battlegroup. SBD provides guidance to the development of a future fleet 
architecture, but it cannot possibly consider all factors that must be addressed in the final 
   
 
 xxi 
fleet solution. A factor that must be considered in any future addition to this research is 
platform vulnerability to specific threats and scenarios.  
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The construction of something as vast and complex as the United States Navy is 
an endeavor not undertaken lightly. Much planning and preparation is invested to assure 
the systems, weapons, and capabilities developed will be effective not only at the time of 
inception, but well into the future.  With long development, testing and construction 
cycles modern ships take decades to field, and serve for decades following Initial 
Operational Capability introduction. Therefore, it is imperative that we construct the best 
fleet possible, as the fleet we design today will continue to serve for decades to come.  
The United States has traditionally equipped, and its leaders have promised to 
continue to equip, its people with the best and most technologically advanced equipment 
ever developed. From the tiny black box hidden inside a console to the enormity of a 
Carrier Strike Group, the United States relies on equipment to carry out missions. This 
capstone research project optimizes the fleet composition at the level of individual ships 
and platforms while developing analytical tools to inform the construction of the future 
Navy of 2030–2035. 
The measure of naval strength has evolved from simply counting the number and 
size of guns into a multi-dimensional spectrum of warfare where capabilities and 
capacities are much harder to measure. Traditional methods developing the future fleet 
architecture revolved around the concept known today as point-based design (PBD).  For 
example, in the dreadnought era of the early 20th century, tonnage and gun caliber were 
the metrics of a successful fleet. Fleet design and architecture were focused on designing 
large ships with multiple turrets and large guns to encounter an adversarial force with 
similar metrics of fleet quantification.  
Today’s fleets must contend in a far more dangerous, complex, and dynamic 
world of tactics and weapons. They must be prepared to fight subsurface, surface, aerial, 
and space systems in the kinetic, electromagnetic, and cyber domains. Information 
regarding the enemy is equally, if not more important, than the maximum raw firepower 
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one’s fleet is capable of employing. In an age of over-the-horizon targeting, net-centric 
fires, hypersonic anti-ship cruise missile threats, and the proliferation of sub-surface 
capabilities, fleets must be sufficiently flexible to counter, or at least mitigate a 
multidimensional threat axis.  
Utilizing a new project management technique referred to as “Set-Based Design,” 
(for example, see Singer, Doerry, and Buckley 2009) the Naval Postgraduate School 
Systems Engineering Analysis Cohort 26 (SEA-26) developed tools and designed an 
alternative fleet architecture for the 2030–2035 timeframe.  
B. TASKING STATEMENT 
A tasking letter submitted to the team by CAPT (ret) Jeff Kline USN under the 
direction of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV) code N9I guides the 
efforts of the SEA-26 Capstone research project. The original tasking statement outlines 
the techniques to be used, as well as the desired products of the future fleet architecture 
plan.  
Design an alternative fleet architecture (platforms, support) and design 
(concept of strategic employment) to the programmed force for the 2030–
2035 timeframe. Consider the anticipated dynamics of future naval 
combat, emerging technologies, and potential adversaries’ trends in 
systems which threaten U.S. sea control. To the maximum extent possible, 
use set-based design to meet capability, capacity, and mission set 
requirements articulated in A Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority 
and A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower. The fleet 
architecture should include the numbers, kinds, and sizes of vessels, 
numbers and types of associated manned and unmanned vessels, and the 
basic capabilities of each of those platforms. Assess your fleet architecture 
and design against the programmed force costs, technical risk, and their 
ability to satisfy national and military strategy. (Kline 2017)  
C. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The naval fleet of 2035 is currently under construction. In order for the fleet the 
United States is building now to address the future needs of the Navy, the United States 
must consider platform and fleet architectures that will be as flexible and agile as 
possible. By direction of the sponsor, set-based design (SBD) is used in this study to 
attempt to solve the problem of deciding what will best suit our future needs. The tasking 
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statement above provided by OPNAV N9I provides the context below for which this 
research project is based upon: 
Emerging technologies in unmanned systems; autonomy; missile systems; 
undersea systems; long-range, netted and multi-domain sensors; and 
networks create a new environment for operations on and over the sea. 
This changing technology environment both challenges traditional fleet 
operations and provides opportunities for innovative tactics, techniques, 
and procedures to achieve naval objectives in sea control, power 
projection and counter anti-access area denial (A2AD) strategies. The 
Naval Postgraduate School Warfare Innovation Continuum is a series of 
independent, but coordinated cross-campus educational and research 
activities to provide insight into the opportunities for warfighting in the 
complex and electromagnetically contested environment at sea and near 
the sea-land interface. It will address opportunities in unmanned systems 
technologies to support web fires and tactically offensive operations, and 
further develop the concept of electromagnetic maneuver warfare as an 
asymmetric advantage. The larger research question is, “Will emergent 
technologies innovatively employed strengthen naval capabilities in 
contested environments?” (Kline 2017). 
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II. FLEET ARCHITECTURE AND FLEET DESIGN 
A. DEFINITION OF FLEET DESIGN 
“A fleet design is how the fleet, the Navy’s highest warfighting tactical echelon, 
fights, and wins in any environment, as expressed through concepts, doctrine, and tactics, 
techniques, and procedures” (Kline 2017). For the purpose of this team’s report, the fleet 
consists of surface vessels, submarines, manned and unmanned aircraft, and ship-based 
aircraft to conduct naval operations. United States Navy’s fleet is divided into smaller 
numbered and geographically distributed fleets. Given the current fleet design and 
assumption that assets will continue to be placed in the same geographic area of 
operations (AORs) as the 2017 fleet, the SEA-26 team focused our efforts on 
constructing a Fleet Architecture vice a Fleet Design. 
B. DEFINITION OF FLEET ARCHITECTURE 
In order to properly assess what a future United States naval force looks like, it is 
important to first understand what a Fleet Architecture is and how it is defined by leading 
fleet guidance. As defined by CAPT Jeff Kline, USN, Retired, a fleet architecture 
consists of those activities that support the fleet design, to include: 
1. Presence, surge forces, and force packages. 
2. How forces prepare and recover from deployment. 
3. Bases and facilities that support or host the fleet. 
4. Materiel components of the fleet, such as ships, aircraft, unmanned 
vehicles, personnel, weapons, and sensors (2017). 
Based on the definition above, this study delivers a fleet architecture consisting of 
the following five elements: 
1. Number of Vessels. 
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2. Number of Manned Vehicles. 
3. Number of Unmanned Vehicles. 
4. Activities of Ship Life Cycles.  
5. Activities of Facilities for Support. 
C. FLEET DESIGN DEFINITIONS 
Although we are focusing on Fleet Architecture, throughout this report fleet 
design specific terms are used many times in order to assist in the defining and shaping of 
our trade space for the Fleet Architecture tool we are constructing. Below is a short list of 
said design terms, commonly referred to as “-ilities” 
Flexibility: Ships built with the ability to conduct multiple missions or accept 
mission systems and equipment that can be removed and replaced pier-side, in a short 
period of time, to adapt a ship’s capabilities to a specific mission.  
Modularity: Ships built with common design interfaces and modular components 
that reduce the complexity of adding, adapting, and modernizing capabilities. Modularity 
is commonly paired with commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) tools parts and materials 
which assist in modularity and easy budget cost for the Fleet. 
Commonality: Ability of hardware and software combinations to be easily 
installed and implemented across multiple ship platforms without sacrificing 
performance. Standardization is another term that can help define commonality, along 
with COTS as defined above.  
Scalability: Capabilities developed independently of ships using standardized 
design specifications which allow the same systems, at various scales, to be applied 
across multiple ship platforms. 
D. REQUIREMENTS DEVELOPMENT AND DECOMPOSITION 
The development of requirements for our future fleet analysis is based on the 
source documents A Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority and A Cooperative 
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Strategy for 21st Century Seapower. Based on our analysis of these documents, we define 
the four principle tenants of a fleet architecture below: 
1. Force packages: Presence, surge forces, and force packages; 
2. Preparation and recovery of forces: How forces prepare and recover from 
deployment; 
3. Support Bases and Facilities: Bases and facilities that support or host the 
fleet; and 
4. Material components of the fleet, such as ships, aircraft, unmanned 
vehicles, personnel, weapons, and sensors. 
The measures of effectiveness used in this report’s analytics are derived from 
these four principles, and traceability is provided in Tables 1 and 2.    
Table 1.   Requirement Traceability from A Design for Maintaining Maritime 
Superiority. Adapted from Department of the Navy (2016). 
High Level Needs Statement Line Item Fleet Architecture 
Traceability 
Derived Fleet Architecture 
Requirements 
Shipping traffic over traditional sea 
lanes is increasing, new trade routes 
are opening in the Arctic, and new 
technologies are making undersea 
resources more accessible. 




Additional undersea resources, 
both manned and unmanned, for 
an additional geographic area in 
the Arctic.  
Rise of the global information system 
– the information that rides on the 
servers, undersea cables, satellites, and 
wireless networks that increasingly 
envelop and connect the globe. 
1. Force Packages 
4. Material 
Components 
Increase the capability of 
command computers 
communications control and 
collaborations intelligence (C5I) 
and “grid” centric warfare. Also 
consider warfare capabilities in 
a denied or degraded 
communications environment.  
The increasing rate of technological 
creation and adoption: 
• Multi-layered integrated air 
missile defense (IAMD) 
environment  
1. Force Packages 
4. Material 
Components 
Apply emerging technologies 
that are feasible in the 2030–
2035 timeframe.  Also consider 
that due to ship life cycle 
constraints, the fleet of 2030–
   
 
 8 
High Level Needs Statement Line Item Fleet Architecture 
Traceability 
Derived Fleet Architecture 
Requirements 
• Long range power projection  
• Mark 45 5” extended-range 
• Advanced ASCM threats 
2035 will consist of 60% of the 
fleet of 2017.  
Both China and Russia are also 
engaging in coercion and competition 
below the traditional thresholds of 
high-end conflict, but nonetheless 
exploit the weakness of accepted 
norms in space, cyber and the 
electromagnetic spectrum. The Russian 
Navy is operating with a frequency and 
in areas not seen for almost two 
decades, and the Chinese People’s 
Liberation Army Navy PLA(N) is 
extending its reach around the world. 
1. Force Packages 
2. Preparation and 
Recovery of Forces 




While the National Security 
Strategy of 2017 seems to focus 
on non-state actors and rogue 
nations, the rise of peer 
competitors will be a concern in 
2030–2035.  Consider the return 
of Symmetric Warfare.  
Surge Ready 2. Preparation and 
Recovery of Forces 
Defeat aggression in 
overlapping conflicts. Have an 
adequate number of platforms to 
have a robust fleet response plan 
(FRP).  
Balanced force of submarines, aircraft 
carriers, amphibious ships and surface 
combatants designed for combat. 
1. Force Packages 
4. Material 
Components 
Optimize capabilities of each 
platform in the U.S. Navy’s 
inventory. 
Improve Joint Force interdependence, 
increase synergy with Air Force and 
Army.  For example; intelligence 
surveillance and reconnaissance 
(ISR), terminal high altitude area 
defense (THAAD), Patriot Missile 
Batteries.  Joint Special Forces 
embarked on Navy Ships. 
1. Force Packages 
4. Material 
Components 
After optimization of 
capabilities, consider using 
Army and Air Force assets 
already present rather than using 
additional Navy asset. 
Implement a predictable naval force 
employment model—the Navy’s 
optimized fleet response plan (O-
FRP)—which structures pre-
deployment maintenance, training, and 
inspection schedules. 
1. Force Packages 
2. Preparation and 
Recovery of Forces 




Produce a percentage of 
available and deployable assets. 
Modularity.  Collaborate with our 
industry partners to design 
interoperable and adaptable platforms. 
1. Force Packages 
4. Material 
Components 
Consider platforms with built-in 
versatility. 
Develop networked, integrated, and 
multi-dimensional capabilities to 
defeat adversary air and missile 
1. Force Packages 
4. Material 
Components 
Balance the force among all 
warfare areas. Do not rely on a 
single type of asset or platform 
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High Level Needs Statement Line Item Fleet Architecture 
Traceability 
Derived Fleet Architecture 
Requirements 
threats. for a single warfare area. 
Consider layered and distributed 
concepts. 
Optimize the use of our platform 
payload volume by integrating kinetic 
and non-kinetic warfighting 
capabilities in cyberspace and the 
electromagnetic spectrum. 
1. Force Packages 
4. Material 
Components 
Do not quantify the fleet 
architecture solely in terms of 
offensive capability.  
Continue developing and integrating 
unmanned systems.  This includes air, 
surface, undersea, and land-based 
applications. 
1. Force Packages 
2. Preparation and 
Recovery of Forces 
4. Material 
Components 
Optimize and distribute 
capabilities. 
Prioritize development of long-range 
stand-off weapons based on air, 
underwater, and surface. 
1. Force Packages 
4. Material 
Components 
Consider the development of the 
long range strike Tomahawk and 
Rail Gun combat systems.  
Develop the capability to employ 
connectors, including combinations of 
landing craft, amphibious vehicles, 
small craft, and multi-mission aviation 
platforms in the littoral. 
1. Force Packages 
4. Material 
Components 
Consider amphibious assets 
based upon their ability to 
embark and employ ship to 
shore connectors. 
 
Table 2.   Requirement Traceability from A Cooperative Strategy for 21st 
Century Seapower. Adapted from Department of the Navy (2015). 
High Level Needs Statement Line Item Fleet Architecture 
Traceability 
Derived Fleet Architecture 
Requirements 
Consider Potential Adversaries to Sea 
Control: 
• Consider China’s naval expansion 
• Russian Military modernization 
• North Korea 
• Iran 
• ISIS and Non-State Affiliated 
Actors 
• Receding Arctic 
• Challenges in space and 
cyberspace 
• Coastal Defense Batteries with 
ranges of 700–800 miles at Mach 
5 
• Space sensing, The Navy cannot 
1. Force Packages 
2. Preparation and 
Recovery of Forces 
3. Support Bases and 
Facilities 
4. Material Components 
Must consider the future 
dynamics of naval 
combat.  
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High Level Needs Statement Line Item Fleet Architecture 
Traceability 
Derived Fleet Architecture 
Requirements 
rely on ships remaining hidden for 
extended periods in a 2030 
environment. 
Increase forward deployed ships to reduce 
costly rotations and deployments, boost in 
theatre. 
2. Preparation and 
Recovery of Forces 
3. Support Bases and 
Facilities 
After assets are 
determined, methodically 
and carefully place the 
assets worldwide to 
combat future potential 
adversaries and threats.  
Employ modular designed platforms that 
allow mission modules and payloads to be 
swapped. 
1. Force Packages 
4. Material Components 
Consider platforms with 
built-in versatility. 
Expand the practice of employing adaptive 
force packages, tailored to specific 
regional environments. 
1. Force Packages 
2. Preparation and 
Recovery of Forces 
3. Support Bases and 
Facilities 
4. Material Components 
Must consider the future 
dynamics of naval combat 
and how they apply to 
regional threats. 
Increase the presence in the Gulf from 30 
ships to 40 ships in 2020. 
2. Preparation and 
Recovery of Forces 
3. Support Bases and 
Facilities 
4. Material Components 
Consider additional 
forward deployed assets.  
Develop and evolve our electromagnetic 
maneuver warfare, space, and cyber 
concepts 
1. Force Packages 
4. Material Components 
Increase the capability of 
C5I and “grid” centric 
warfare. Also consider 
warfare capabilities in a 
denied or degraded 
communications 
environment. 
Improve our capability to seize, establish, 
sustain, and protect austere expeditionary 
bases. 
1. Force Packages 
4. Material Components 
Must consider the future 
dynamics of naval 
combat: long range 
standoff strike weapons 
and the future of ship-to-
shore connectors. 
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III. SET-BASED DESIGN 
A. EXPLANATION OF SET-BASED DESIGN 
SBD is a design method that leaves requirements and/or design options open and 
unspecified for a longer period through the design process (for example see Singer, 
Doerry, and Buckley 2009). SBD provides the design team with flexibility from 
requirements analysis to establishment of the final system design. As the design deadline 
approaches, empirical data is used to collapse focus to the final design options. This 
could also be summarized as make all of the decisions as late as possible to not exclude 
any promising design options. 
The “sets” in SBD can describe a set of design options that describe one possible 
permutation of the design of a system. Therefore, each set has a different description and 
consequently different requirements. The goal of SBD is to allow those different 
requirements from each set to remain candidates for the final design - in other words, 
keep the requirements feasible until the design team is ready to commit to a final design. 
Ideally, the final system design will satisfy requirements common to all sets in order to 
produce the most versatile system possible. In Figure 1, each colored elliptical region 
represents a set, each of which possess design options unique to the set. At the end of the 
SBD process, a selection of design options is drawn from the feasible region common to 
all sets. 




Figure 1.  Concept of Set-Based Design 
 
B. SET-BASED DESIGN VS. POINT BASED DESIGN 
The traditional design process (point-based design) involves the commitment to a 
design option (requirement, specification, concept, etc.) as soon as the decision can be 
made. All further progress through the design process is then based on that chosen design 
option. As the system design matures, the design team continues to commit to design 
options to converge on a final system design. However, in the late stages of the design 
process, the potential for changes to design options exist. If the design team changes 
design options in later stages of the design process, then the design process incurs major 
penalties in terms of cost and time to rework the design at the point of the altered design 
option. For example, in PBD of an automobile, the team may commit to an engine 
specification of 285 horsepower (HP). Consequently, the components of the engine will 
be designed around producing 285 HP. If later in the project the design team decides to 
increase the power specification to 300 HP, the team will have to redesign the 
components to meet that new requirement.  
SBD eliminates the major penalties of cost and time by replacing the commitment 
to a specific design option with a field of probable design options instead. In SBD of the 
automobile mentioned previously, the team will not commit to a particular specification, 
but rather an acceptable interval, such as 250–350 HP. In this way, engine components 
can be designed to be within a particular range to meet the acceptable interval for the 
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specification, and the design team can choose any quantity between 250 - 350 HP for the 
final system design without suffering the same consequences in PBD. Figure 2 visually 
compares SBD and PBD. In SBD, potential permutations of a final system design are 
numerous early in the design process, but a particular design is realized over time through 
continual analyses of alternatives. However, in PBD, the design team may come close to 
converging on a final system design, but may change design options and face numerous 
new permutations of a final system design. 
 
Figure 2.  Comparison of Set-Based Design and Point-Based Design. Source: 
Singer, Doerry, and Buckley (2009). 
C. SET-BASED DESIGN APPLIED TO THE FLEET ARCHITECTURE 
The objective of this study is to produce a fleet architecture (as defined in  
Chapter II.B using SBD. For the purposes of this study, the definition of a “set” is as 
follows: 
 
A set is a unique emphasis on warfighting capabilities of the fleet in the 
2030–2035 timeframe that possesses a unique description and unique 
requirements for the warfare areas of Strike Warfare, Anti-Air Warfare, 
Surface Warfare, Anti-Submarine Warfare, Electronic Warfare, Mine 
Warfare, Amphibious Warfare, and Ballistic Missile Defense. 
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Set descriptions are provided in Chapter III.D. The warfare areas are defined in 
Section IV.F. as MOPs for this study. The unique requirements specific to each set are 
provided as feasibility constraints in Chapter V.D.4 as they apply to SBD. 
This study does not select a superior set; it enumerates the platforms required to 
meet the requirements based upon the intersecting contribution of multiple sets. 
 
D. SET DESCRIPTIONS 
(0) Set Zero (Baseline, Current Day) 
a. This set is merely a reflection of current day (2017) fleet design. While 
there is some flex to be understood, with new ships being built and old 
ships being retrofitted in the yards, we assume that there is no unmanned 
(autonomous) systems in use and the littoral combat ship (LCS) is 
restricted to nine working platforms. This baseline is generally considered 
the “big ship, lots of capabilities and warfare areas, aircraft carrier” fleet 
design. With eleven nuclear powered carriers, this design relies on air 
power projection from sea to support Amphibious Warfare (AMW), and 
Anti-Air Warfare (AAW) operations. An important second primary 
mission area is strategic deterrence via Surface Warfare (SUW). Set Zero 
will be the baseline against which all other sets will be measured. (271 
ships). 
b. Requirements Derivation: Given the past wars that the U.S. Navy has 
fought, today’s Navy (2017) mirrors the requirements set in the Cold War 
and WWII. As we plan to fight our naval battles primarily in Blue Water, 
today’s fleet is centralized on the CSG and its ability to project over large 
areas at sea and over land. Specific information on the complement and 
utilization of a CSG is provided in Appendix B. 
c. Fleet Quantification Assumptions: Please see Appendix A.  
(1) Set One (Sea Control Focus) 
a. This set leans heavily on Wayne Hughes “A New Navy Fighting 
Machine” fleet design (Hughes 2009). It focuses on SUW via a multitude 
of small single or dual mission areas. This architecture is comprised of 
304 ships seeing an increase on the Baseline design via the small SUW 
craft such as LCS or missile boats. Although this navy will continue blue 
water operations, the primary focus of this fleet design will be on green 
water operation. This shift in focus helps deter and restrict growing 
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foreign navies such as the PLAN (China), KPN (North Korea), IRIN 
(Iran) and other aggressive but fiscally constrained countries.  
b. Requirements Derivation: This Set traces its roots from the rapidly 
growing threat posed by the PLAN. While its fleet has only an emerging 
robust blue water capacity, its capabilities operating inside China’s 
exclusive economic zone (EEZ, inside 200 nm) are striking. Given that 
China’s Fleet composition is heavily biased towards small, fast and 
somewhat disposable missile boats, its ability to accept losses while still 
being an effective counter ship naval force infers the U.S. Navy must 
change to counter their strengths, if the U.S. wishes to have a viable 
influence in the Chinese EEZ. 
c. Fleet Quantification Assumptions: Littoral focus yields new designed U.S. 
missile boats or the reconfiguring of the LCS class. Further discussion of 
LCS capabilities and mission modules is included in Appendix H. 
(2) Set Two (South China Sea / Pacific Theater, Surface and Unmanned 
Focus) 
a. This fleet set is structured to fulfill both a blue and green water focus 
instead of a single objective as is the case in fleet design Zero and One. In 
order to meet the demand of both high sea operations and littorals, this 
fleet architecture calls for a drastic increase of ship numbers. In this 
design, we can expect the SSGN, Cruiser-Destroyer Forces, and light 
aircraft carrier (CVL) production numbers to increase. More information 
on the CVL and light carrier group (CLG) concepts are provided in 
Appendix D. Without additional ships, this fleet set will fail to cover both 
of the large domains it seeks to emphasize. Since this architecture follows 
the generic “big and little” of “high and low” navy concept, merely 
increasing ship numbers will not be enough to match the ever growing 
foreign navy presence in the Pacific, and specifically, the South China 
Sea. To fill these voids, this fleet architecture will include a large number 
and wide variety of unmanned systems. Specifically, unmanned aerial 
vehicles (UAVs) of group 3, 4, and 5 (Appendix G), unmanned surface 
vessels (USVs), (medium displacement unmanned surface vessel 
(MDUSV)), and unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) will be the center 
pieces for filling gaps in: comms nets and systems, surface or subsurface 
restricted mission sets, and reduced risk to human life reconnaissance and 
information gathering missions. Additional information on MDUSV and 
UUV can be found in Appendix I and K, respectively.  
b. Requirements Derivation: There is a large push to increase the U.S. 
Navy’s capabilities and assets in all water areas (blue, green, and brown). 
This push will demand a much higher mission flexibility of existing naval 
assets or a massive increase in platform numbers. In 2017 the Army 
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covers brown water areas however in the future the Navy will likely have 
a larger role in this domain. 
c. Fleet Quantification Assumptions: UxV technology will be mature enough 
to be tested and serviceable in the Fleet. They will provide real capabilities 
to the Fleet and reduce the burden on manpower and maintenance 
compared to existing manned systems.  
(3) Set Three (Ballistic Missile Defense and Strike Warfare Focus) 
a. This fleet set focuses on the ever present ballistic missile nuclear warfare 
threat. While there are relatively few countries that can “reach” the United 
States with nuclear missiles, the technology is growing and proliferating 
rapidly to smaller, less developed countries. To combat the growth in 
nuclear threats, this fleet architecture calls for a drastic increase in the 
SSBN numbers along with a UAV heavy comms net. Since detecting and 
destroying ICBMs in flight is only half the fight, this architecture will shift 
its main warfare focus to Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) and Strike 
Warfare (STW) to both find and destroy ballistic missiles flight, and the 
facilities on the ground, further preventing adversary capabilities to 
conduct ballistic missile warfare. The UAV comms net will be a system of 
systems that employs the current day cooperative engagement capability 
to link both Navy BMD assets jointly with Army and Air Force assets; 
specifically THAAD, Patriot, ISR, and sea based x-band radar.  
b. Requirements Derivation: as rising world powers continue to test and 
develop their own nuclear programs, the U.S. Navy and U.S. Air Force 
face a growing demand on their ballistic missile defense programs. 
Today’s aging AEGIS system, although adapting and receiving upgrades, 
is a system that will not be able to face this rising demand for BMD 
worldwide with current construction rates.  
c. Fleet Quantification Assumptions: over the next 20 years North Korea, 
Russia, China will continue to push their presence on the world stage via 
BM power. We are also assuming that there will be at least 2–3 more 
nations that rise up with nuclear programs of their own. The fleet 
quantification assumptions come from stakeholder responses from 
questions provided in Appendix M.  
(4) Set Four (Green and Brown Water Focus) 
a. This fleet architecture set embodies the idea that the future of the U.S. 
Navy Fleet lays in future platforms. To employ this mentality, this fleet 
design calls for ceasing the production of all Destroyer (DDG) 51 classes 
and nuclear aircraft carrier (CVN) classes. In their stead we focus the 
majority of our shipbuilding budget into the DDG 1000, SSGN, LCS, and 
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LPD 17 classes along with heavy unmanned systems involvement (UAV, 
UUV, and ACTUV). These unmanned systems will create Unmanned 
Underwater Groups (UUG)not on acronym list. More information on the 
UUG concept can be found in Appendix E. Each of these platforms brings 
some of the most modern developments in weaponry along with the ability 
to be flexible. This flexibility comes from the ability to be modular and 
employ technology that has the ability to learn and the physical room to 
develop and change throughout the life of the platform. This type of 
flexibility boosts the fleet’s ability to become more reactive to whatever 
environments our nation calls for. This fleet architecture replaces the CVN 
battle group centric concept with a “small lineup” utilizing the DDG 1000 
as the high value unit while focusing in on speed, tactics, and firepower to 
gain tactical advantage over adversaries mainly in the green and brown 
water areas, yet still being able to fight in blue water. The DDG 1000 is 
adopted as a High-Value Unit alongside the CVN and will be redesigned 
as a Battleship. The Battleship is at the center of a battleship battle group 
(BBG) and augments the CVN and their associated CSG. More 
information on the BBG concept can be found in Appendix F. By more 
units doing less, the fleet can accomplish more missions in smaller areas 
on a larger scale. 
b. Requirements Derivation: Since the cost of building the traditional style 
naval fleet, CVNs specifically, is too expensive for congressional 
budgeting, the U.S. Navy is being forced to adapt and convert to a more 
cost effective fleet. Today the navy has one commissioned DDG1000. It is 
capable of absorbing the communications and command and decision 
C&D aspects brought to the fight traditionally by CVNs. Its AEGIS suite 
is the newest and most capable system in the fleet and it has the space to 
house a fleet-level staff making it the ideal new high value unit at a 
significantly lower cost than the CVN. The DDG-1000 is also much more 
capable of defending itself than the CVN and will require a smaller 
compliment of guard ships. With advanced technology in Anti-Submarine 
Warfare (ASW), AAW, BMD, and SUW (rail gun), the Zumwalt provides 
capabilities for tomorrow’s fleet demands at cost. 
c. Fleet Quantification Assumptions: budget for the U.S. fleet will only 
continue to decrease as political pressure forces cutbacks on Department 
of Defense (DOD) budget. 
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IV. MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS  
The measures of effectiveness (MOEs) for this study are used to measure the 
degree to which the resultant fleet architecture meets the essential functions of the Navy 
as described in Section III of A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower. The 
essential functions of the Navy are: All Domain Access, Deterrence, Sea Control, Power 
Projection, and Maritime Security. 
This study derives a MOE for each essential function, except Maritime Security. 
As stated in A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, “Maritime security 
protects U.S. sovereignty and maritime resources, supports free and open seaborne 
commerce, and counters weapons proliferation, terrorism, transnational crime, piracy, 
illegal exploitation of the maritime environment, and unlawful seaborne immigration.” 
Through sanctions, U.S. Navy maritime interdiction operations, and U.S. Coast Guard 
operations, Maritime Security is assumed to be fulfilled with any of this study’s fleet sets. 
The final MOE establishes “Fleet Flexibility,” defined in this study as the average 
number of warfare areas (out of the eight previously listed) attained by the numbered 
fleets that possess platforms. In other words, Fleet Flexibility is a check to ensure that the 
numbered fleets can perform in the eight warfare areas required by the Navy. 
This study adopts a total of five fleet level MOEs to measure the degree to which 
the fleet architecture accomplishes the essential functions and warfare areas of the Navy: 
• MOE 1 – Domain Grid Factor (All Domain Access) 
• MOE 2 – Cumulative Deterrence Coverage (Deterrence) 
• MOE 3 – Weapon Density (Sea Control) 
• MOE 4 – Cumulative Power Projection (Power Projection) 
• MOE 5 – Fleet Flexibility 
Each MOE and the associated variables and criteria is explained in the subsequent 
sections. 
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The main constraint in this study is the SCN budget for fiscal year (FY) 2035. The 
SCN budget constraint is $164,000,000,000 ($164B, FY2035$). Therefore, the new ship 
construction for the fleet architecture between 2017 and 2035 must not exceed $164B, 
FY2035$. 
A. MOE 1 – DOMAIN GRID FACTOR  
All Domain Access is defined in A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century 
Seapower as the “ability to project military force in contested areas with sufficient 
freedom of action to operate effectively.” “The ability to project military force in 
contested areas” involves presence in contested areas with weapons coverage and the 
appropriate sensors to establish fire control if necessary. The coverage applies to the air, 
surface, and subsurface physical domains. “Sufficient freedom of action” is assumed to 
be available through the establishment of rules of engagement and adherence to tactics, 
techniques, and procedures defined by doctrine and established procedures at the tactical 
unit level (e.g. Commanding Officer’s Standing Orders). To achieve All Domain Access, 
weapons must cover all physical domains, but must have sensor coverage that 
encompasses at least the same magnitude of area as the weapons coverage. Therefore, a 
“Domain Grid Factor” is defined below as the MOE to measure All Domain Access: 
 









𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴 = Air Sensor Coverage Ratio =  
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆 (𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃2)
𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶 𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶 𝐵𝐵𝐴𝐴 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶 (𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃2) 
 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 = Surface Sensor Coverage Ratio =  
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴 𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆 (𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃2)
𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶 𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶 𝐵𝐵𝐴𝐴 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶 (𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃2) 
 
𝑆𝑆𝑈𝑈 = Subsurface Sensor Coverage Ratio = 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴 𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆 (𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃2)
𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶 𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶 𝐵𝐵𝐴𝐴 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶 (𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃2) 
 
𝑊𝑊𝐴𝐴 = Air Weapon Coverage Ratio =   
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑊𝑊𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑊𝑊𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆 (𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃2)
𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶 𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶 𝐵𝐵𝐴𝐴 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶 (𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃2) 
 
𝑊𝑊𝑆𝑆 = Surface Weapon Coverage Ratio = 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴 𝑊𝑊𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑊𝑊𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆 (𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃2)
𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶 𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶 𝐵𝐵𝐴𝐴 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶 (𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃2) 
 
𝑊𝑊𝑈𝑈 = Subsurface Weapon Coverage Ratio = 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴 𝑊𝑊𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑊𝑊𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆 (𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃2)
𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶 𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶 𝐵𝐵𝐴𝐴 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶 (𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃2) 
 
 
For each term of MOE 1, limits are imposed, subject to the input of stakeholders. For 
example: 
• All ratios, SA, SS, SU, WA, WS, and WU, may be at least 0.8. 
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• All ratios, 𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴
𝑊𝑊𝐴𝐴




, may be at least 0.8. 
Any deviation from these limits would require additional analysis. 
Each factor given above is a ratio of the amount of area covered by the global 
allocation of platforms to the amount of area required to be covered in the appropriate 
domain. Therefore, each ratio is unit-less and represents a relative degree to which the 
coverage is accomplished comparing the coverages in 2035 to those in 2017. This report 
does not advocate for a larger or smaller domain grid factor for overall fleet design, as 
this MOE only provides a reference point from which to compare the future fleets against 
one another.  
Figure 3 provides a visual representation of the grid factor. A larger grid factor 
equates to more sensor coverage compared to weapon coverage. 
 
Figure 3.  Visual Representation of Domain Grid Factor 
B. MOE 2 – CUMULATIVE DETERRENCE COVERAGE 
According to A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, “We achieve 
deterrence by convincing potential enemies that they cannot win or that the cost of 
aggression would be unacceptable (Department of the Navy 2015). This function 
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supports the naval missions of defending the homeland, deterring conflict, and 
strengthening partnerships.” A collective psychological effect cannot be quantified, due 
to the varying global threats and constantly changing environment that the Navy must 
adapt to. However, having assets deployed and underway will contribute to a 
psychological effect similar to the way assets are employed in today’s fleet. Particularly, 
BMD and STW-capable assets coupled with ships and nuclear submarines positioned to 
act at all times can convince potential enemies that “the cost of aggression would be 
unacceptable.” Therefore, a “Cumulative Deterrence Coverage” is defined as the MOE to 
measure Deterrence:  
 




𝜀𝜀𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 = Ratio of Operational Area BMD Weapon Coverage =  
    𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 𝑊𝑊𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑊𝑊𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵−𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑊𝑊𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆 (𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃
2)
𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑂𝑂𝑊𝑊𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶 𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶 𝐵𝐵𝐴𝐴 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶 (𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃2) 
 
 
𝜀𝜀𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝑊𝑊 = Ratio of Strike-Capable Platforms Deployed and Underway =  
    𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃 𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴 𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑊𝑊𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆 𝑈𝑈𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑈𝑈𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏 𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆 𝑃𝑃ℎ𝐴𝐴 2035 𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃
0.25 ∗ 23 ∗ 𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃 𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴 𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑊𝑊𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆 𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆 𝑃𝑃ℎ𝐴𝐴 2017 𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃
 
 
𝜀𝜀𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆 = Ratio of Ship Platforms Deployed and Underway =  
    𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃 𝑆𝑆ℎ𝐴𝐴𝑊𝑊 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆 𝑈𝑈𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑈𝑈𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏 𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆 𝑃𝑃ℎ𝐴𝐴 2035 𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃
0.25 ∗ 23 ∗ 𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃 𝑆𝑆ℎ𝐴𝐴𝑊𝑊 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆 𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆 𝑃𝑃ℎ𝐴𝐴 2017 𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃
 
 
𝜀𝜀𝑆𝑆𝑈𝑈𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆 = Approximate Ratio of Submarines Deployed and Underway =  
    𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃 𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑏𝑏𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆 𝑈𝑈𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑈𝑈𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏 𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆 𝑃𝑃ℎ𝐴𝐴 2035 𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃
0.25 ∗ 23 ∗ 𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃 𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑏𝑏𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆 𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆 𝑃𝑃ℎ𝐴𝐴 2017 𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃
 
 
Note: all numbers are completely notional and do not reflect the actual 
deployed force levels. 
 
All ratios (𝜀𝜀𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵, 𝜀𝜀𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝑊𝑊, 𝜀𝜀𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆, and 𝜀𝜀𝑆𝑆𝑈𝑈𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆) are multiplied to calculate Cumulative 
Deterrence Coverage, 𝛴𝛴. This study assumes that approximately 25% of all platforms in 
the fleet will be deployed at any given time. Furthermore, of those platforms deployed, 
approximately 66% (⅔) are assumed to be kept underway at any given time. Therefore, 
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the denominators in the ratios are a standard (proportion of the 2017 fleet platforms) with 
which the numerators (2035 fleet platforms that can be underway) are compared. All ratio 
denominators will be less than 1.0 since not every platform in the 2017 fleet is deployed 
and underway. However, A Cumulative Deterrence Coverage less than 1.0 represents a 
lesser achievement of Deterrence in 2035 than that in 2017, whereas a Cumulative 
Deterrence Coverage greater than 1.0 represents a relatively greater achievement of 
Deterrence in 2035 than that in 2017. 
To assure the effectiveness of any proposed fleet, the measured ratios need to 
exist within reasonable bounds. Therefore, each ratio factor will have associated criteria 
that must met. For each term of MOE 2, limits are imposed, subject to the input of 
stakeholders. For example: 
• Ratio of operational area BMD weapon coverage,  𝜀𝜀𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵, must be at least 0.9. 
• Ratio of strike-capable platforms deployed and underway, 𝜀𝜀𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝑊𝑊, must be at 
least 0.8. 
• Ratio of ship platforms deployed and underway, 𝜀𝜀𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆 , must be at least 0.8. 
• Ratio of submarines deployed and underway, 𝜀𝜀𝑆𝑆𝑈𝑈𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆,  must be at least 0.8. 
By establishing these criteria, the fleet can be ensured to achieve individual ratios 
of 0.8; additionally, at least 90% of the global operational areas will be covered by Navy 
BMD assets immediately able to respond and in 2035, the Navy can have at least 80% of 
the quantity of platforms that were underway at any given time in 2017. 
C. MOE 3 – WEAPON DENSITY 
As explained in A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, “Sea control 
allows naval forces to establish local maritime superiority while denying an adversary 
that same ability. Forward naval forces employ a full spectrum of layered capabilities for 
the destruction of enemy naval forces, suppression of enemy sea commerce, and 
protection of vital sea lanes, including ports of embarkation and debarkation, which 
enables strategic sealift and facilitates the arrival of follow-on forces (Department of the 
Navy 2015).” Therefore, the Navy must keep sea lanes available for use and must provide 
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protection over those sea lanes in order to establish sea control. Assuming continued 
diplomacy retains the sea lanes available to the Navy today, the ability to protect those 
sea lanes must be quantified. The amount of SUW-specific munitions available for 
deployment per square nautical mile can measure the ability of the fleet to deny an 
adversary local maritime superiority, given sea lanes are available. Therefore, a “Weapon 
Density” is defined as the MOE to measure Sea Control:  
 




where   
 NSUW = MOPSUW 
 A = Total required sea lanes to be covered by the fleet (nm2) 
MOPSUW= Maximum possible number of surface targets that can be 
engaged in 24 hours 
 Note: Critical areas of operation are measured in Appendix N. 
Similar to MOE 2, criteria must be established for Weapon Density in order to provide 
adequate capability for the Fleet to achieve Sea Control. Additionally, weapon coverage 
must also be considered alongside weapon density and the area of sea lanes differs 
between each area of responsibility for the Combatant Commands (COCOMs). 
Therefore, a “Ratio of Weapon Coverage” criterion is defined in order to supplement 
MOE 3. A limit can be imposed, subject to the input of stakeholders. For example: 




=  must be at least 0.9 per geographic 
region. 
where 
 i = Geographic Region 
Wi = SUW Weapon Coverage of All Platforms in Geographic Region i (nm2) 
(Value defined by user; original report results based on quantity of weapons 
present on available ships as defined in appendix A.)  
Ai = Total Required Sea Lanes to be Covered in Geographic Region i (nm2) 
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The MOE 3 Criterion ensures that consideration is given to the areas of 
responsibility for each Combatant Command in support of the global Weapon Density. 
Different platforms will offer different quantities of SUW munitions as shown in  
Figure 4. Therefore, the platform composition of the fleet architecture will determine 
MOE 3. 
 
Figure 4.  Weapon Density Contribution  
D. MOE 4 – CUMULATIVE POWER PROJECTION 
Power Projection is defined in A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower 
as “the ability of a nation to apply all or some of its elements of national power—
diplomatic, informational, military, or economic—to respond to crises, contribute to 
deterrence, and enhance regional stability. Naval power projection includes conventional 
strikes against targets ashore, integrated kinetic strikes and non-kinetic fires against 
enemy forces, advance force operations, raids, and all forms of amphibious operations, 
from ship-to-objective maneuver and sea-based fire support to forces ashore to missions 
conducted by Naval Special Warfare and Special Operations Forces (Department of the 
Navy 2015).” The scope of the Fleet Architecture encompasses the military element of 
national power. Power Projection can be measured in a similar manner to Deterrence, in 
that having particular assets deployed and underway will allow the Navy to project power 
in a moment’s notice. Assets that contribute most to Power Projection include strike-
capable assets, amphibious warfare ships (supplemented with Marine personnel and 
equipment), and nuclear submarines. Therefore, a “Cumulative Power Projection” is 
defined to as MOE 4 to measure the ability of the Fleet Architecture to achieve Power 
Projection:  
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 𝜀𝜀𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝑊𝑊 = Ratio of Strike-Capable Assets Deployed AND Underway =  
 
𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃 𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴 𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑊𝑊𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆 𝑈𝑈𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑈𝑈𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏 𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃 𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏 𝐺𝐺𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆 𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴 𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆 𝑃𝑃ℎ𝐴𝐴 2035 𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃
0.25 ∗2 3 ∗ 𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃 𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴 𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑊𝑊𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆 𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆 𝑃𝑃ℎ𝐴𝐴 2017 𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃
 
 
 𝜀𝜀𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵𝑊𝑊 = Ratio of Amphibious Ships Deployed AND Underway =  
 
𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃 𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑊𝑊ℎ𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆 𝑆𝑆ℎ𝐴𝐴𝑊𝑊 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆 𝑈𝑈𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑈𝑈𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏 𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃 𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏 𝐺𝐺𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆 𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴 𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆 𝑃𝑃ℎ𝐴𝐴 2035 𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃
0.25 ∗ 23 ∗ 𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃 𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑊𝑊ℎ𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆 𝑆𝑆ℎ𝐴𝐴𝑊𝑊 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆 𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆 𝑃𝑃ℎ𝐴𝐴 2017 𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃
 
 
 𝜀𝜀𝑆𝑆𝑈𝑈𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆 = Ratio of Submarines Deployed AND Underway =  
  
 𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃 𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑏𝑏𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆 𝑈𝑈𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑈𝑈𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏 𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃 𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏 𝐺𝐺𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆 𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴 𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆 𝑃𝑃ℎ𝐴𝐴 2035 𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃
0.25 ∗ 23 ∗ 𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃 𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑏𝑏𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆 𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆 𝑃𝑃ℎ𝐴𝐴 2017 𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃
 
 
These ratios are calculated in a similar fashion to MOE 2. As previously 
mentioned, this study assumes that approximately 25% of all platforms in the fleet will be 
deployed at any given time. Furthermore, of those platforms deployed, approximately 
66% will be underway at any given time. All ratio denominators will be less than 1.0 
since not every platform in the 2017 fleet is deployed and underway. However, A 
Cumulative Power Projection less than 1.0 represents a lesser achievement of Power 
Projection in 2035 than that in 2017 whereas a Cumulative Power Projection greater than 
1.0 represents a relatively greater achievement of Power Projection in 2035 than that in 
2017. 
However, the ratios need to be within acceptable bounds. Therefore, each ratio 
factor will have associated criteria that can be met. For each term of MOE 4, limits are 
imposed, subject to the input of stakeholders. For example: 
• Ratio of Strike-Capable Platforms Deployed and Underway, 𝜀𝜀𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝑊𝑊, must 
be at least 0.8.  
 
• Ratio of Amphibious Ship Platforms Deployed and Underway, 𝜀𝜀𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵𝑊𝑊, 
must be at least 0.8. 
 
• Ratio of Submarines Deployed and Underway, 𝜀𝜀𝑆𝑆𝑈𝑈𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆, must be at least 0.8. 
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By establishing these criteria, the fleet can be ensured to achieve individual ratios 
of 0.8. In 2035, the Navy can have at least 80% of the quantity of platforms that were 
underway at any given time in 2017. 
E. MOE 5 – FLEET FLEXIBILITY 
Fleet Flexibility is a MOE derived for this study to ensure that every numbered 
fleet that possesses platforms (Fleet Forces, 3rd Fleet, 4th Fleet, 5th Fleet, 6th Fleet, and 
7th Fleet) is capable of performing each of the eight warfare areas defined previously. A 
flexible fleet architecture would mean that every numbered fleet that possesses platforms 
can perform Strike Warfare, Anti-Air Warfare, Surface Warfare, Anti-Submarine 
Warfare, Electronic Warfare, Mine Warfare, Amphibious Warfare, and Ballistic Missile 
Defense if called upon. Therefore, a “Fleet Flexibility” MOE is defined as the degree to 
which the resultant fleet architecture is flexible among warfare areas: 
 







 𝐹𝐹𝑗𝑗 = Flexibility score of Numbered Fleet j 
 
Mathematically, Fleet Flexibility, 𝜏𝜏, is an average. If all six numbered fleets with 
platforms possessed platforms that allowed them to participate in all eight warfare areas, 
then Fleet Flexibility = 8, meaning all numbered fleets can perform any warfare area at 
any given time. 
Ideally, the quantitative equations used to calculate MOE’s and other evaluated 
metrics favor a flexible fleet. Individual platform warfare area contributions are 
calculated from a platform which is heavily focused on the warfare area in question. The 
platform could not maintain its attributed level of combat effectiveness across all warfare 
areas at all times. For example, a DDG which is focused on ASW will be much more 
effective at conducting ASW than it would be if it were conducting simultaneous ASW, 
BMD, SUW, and STW missions. However, a DDG contributes to all of its possible 
warfare areas as if it were concentrating on each warfare area simultaneously. Using this 
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method produces a flexible fleet because platforms which are able to perform a wide 
variety of missions contribute more to the MOPs and MOEs in question than single 
mission ships. Because this ‘fixed points’ method was used to model the fleet 
optimization, a specific and unique flexibility metric was not used in this study. 
F. MEASURES OF PERFORMANCE 
The MOEs described in the previous section measure the ability of the final fleet 
architecture to meet the essential functions of the Navy and achieve flexibility between 
warfare areas. However, in order to implement SBD in the design process of creating a 
fleet architecture, this study uses a unique Measure of Performance (MOP) for each 
warfare area. Given the large scope of factors and varying degrees of time which can be 
quantified to measure the performance of the fleet in each warfare area, the MOPs are 
given a scope of 24-hour periods. For example, the MOP for Strike Warfare is the 
maximum number of potential targets destroyed throughout a 24-hour operational period. 
The MOPs for each warfare area are defined below: 
Strike Warfare 
MOPSTW = Maximum Number of Targets that could be Destroyed per 24-Hour 




MOPAAW = Maximum Number of Targets that could be Destroyed per 24-Hour 





MOPSUW = Maximum Number of Targets that could be Destroyed per 24-Hour 









MOPASW = Maximum Number of Targets that could be Destroyed per 24-Hour 
Period (in units of 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴
24 ℎ𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆
) 
Electronic Warfare (EW) 
MOPEW = Number of Electronic-Attack Capable Assets 
Mine Warfare (MIW) 
MOPMIW = Maximum Number of Mines that could be Cleared per 24-Hour 




MOPAMW = Number of marine expeditionary units (MEU’s) Capable of Being 
Carried 
The MOPs are used to measure each individual platform’s contribution to total 
fleet capability. The final fleet architecture will be built upon these assumptions as 
described in Section V. 
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V. OPTIMIZING A FLEET  
A. INTRODUCTION 
For any optimization effort, the naval fleet architecture’s value must be 
quantifiable. The chosen quantification methodology breaks down each platform’s 
warfighting capabilities (CAPs) into the eight warfare areas (Strike Warfare, Anti-
Submarine Warfare, Air Warfare etc.) which are the platform’s MOPs. The quantified 
MOPs for all ships are then combined cumulatively to compute fleet MOPs or “Fleet 
warfighting capabilities.” The possibilities of using synergistic effects and/or diminishing 
returns were explored but a simple additive method is used as it most accurately reflects 
the effective employment of distributed tactics to fight the fleet. 
For a simple visual example of the basic fleet quantification method refer to Table 
3 which shows NOTIONAL MOPs attributable to each CVN and each Guided Missile 
Cruiser (CG). A full accounting of all MOPs used for every platform is presented in 
Appendix A. If we assemble a “fleet” consisting only of one CVN and two CGs, this fleet 
would have a Strike MOP of 101 (40 from the CVN plus 30.5 from each CG) and an 
Electronic Warfare MOP of 14 (10 from the CVN and 2 from each CG). In this way, the 
main objective function seeks to maximize the fleet’s warfighting capabilities by 
selecting the number of each class of ship to build which provides the Navy with the 
greatest capabilities in the eight warfare areas.   
Table 3.   NOTIONAL MOPs Example 
 Strike AAW SUW ASW EW MIW AMW BMD 
CVN 40 40 40 7 10 0 0 0 
CG 30.5 30.5 46 34 2 0 0 30.5 
 
Maximizing all eight MOPs simultaneously is accomplished in the main objective 
function discussed in section V.B. The goal of the objective function, stated briefly is 
‘pick the right mix of platforms to maximize each warfare area, without excessively 
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disadvantaging any particular warfare area.’ In this tiny example, the CVN dominates in 
STW and EW, while the CG dominates in BMD. This fleet is not balanced, however, as it 
has no MIW or AMW capabilities. More platforms have to be added to achieve those 
capabilities. 
 Notes on the Spreadsheet Model: 
While reducing the performance of a particular warfare area down to a single 
number, several assumptions are made, and a few ‘points of concern’ are addressed to 
make sure that the results provide a value to the assessments.  
The first point is the balancing of the MOPs. Each MOP is based on a very 
different scale. For example; the Strike MOP is based on number of targets that could be 
engaged and the Amphibious Warfare MOP is based on number of Marine Expeditionary 
Units capable of being embarked. These MOPs must somehow be normalized before 
simultaneously optimizing them or the costlier MOP “points” will be heavily neglected. 
In other words; it is cheaper to add one ‘strike point’ with one missile than to add an 
‘amphibious warfare point’ with entire additional MEU. The method chosen for the 
normalization of MOPs is to compare each MOP subject to optimizing to the Baseline 
2017 Fleet MOP. A ratio of ‘baseline 2017 points’ over ‘proposed future 2035 points’ is 
used. By this method the baseline fleet, by definition, is given a score of 1.0 for all MOPs 
and the future fleet MOP values can be intuitively understood as a percentage increase or 
decrease from today’s fleet’s capability. For example, a Strike Warfare score of 1.4 
would equate to a fleet which has 140% of the Strike warfare capability of today’s fleet 
or a 40% increase in capability over today’s fleet. Similarly, a 0.9 would indicate only 
90% of the capability of today’s fleet, or a 10% decrease. Normalizing the MOPs in this 
way surmounts the challenge presented by differently scaled MOPs. 
Another complication to effectively optimize all eight MOPs simultaneously is for 
all warfare areas to be considered equally important. By introducing a weighting factor, 
which can be applied to the normalized MOP score, we can manipulate the importance 
that the optimization main objective function places on each warfare area. In order for the 
objective function to properly function, each warfare area must contain weighted values 
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provided by stakeholders and subject matter experts. Changing these weightings has no 
effect on the optimization function until all of the constraints are satisfied. After the 
constraints are all satisfied, the selected warfare area weights will affect the preferential 
spending of the remaining budget money to maximize the fleet’s warfighting capabilities.      
The objective of the optimization model is to maximize the cumulative weighted 
warfare capabilities compared to the baseline 2017 Fleet. This only occurs after all 
constraints are satisfied. These constraints can change drastically depending on the user 
inputs which are described below. 
B. CONSTRAINTS 
The objective function is constrained by the following circumstances: 
• Minimum Ship Constraint: This report does not generate a future 
unconstrained dream fleet as if starting from a clean slate. This study’s 
purpose is to produce meaningful insight into the way to move forward 
toward a better and more effective fleet in 2035, starting from what we 
have now. To meet this end we assume no ships will be decommissioned 
prior to the end of their expected service life. To this effect, we identify 
the number of each class of ship which are planned to still be within their 
operational life in 2035. This is the number that the fleet will contain if no 
new ships are constructed between now and 2035 and ships will be retired 
at the end of their design life. This number will serve as the constraint on 
the minimum number of each ship type and is referred to as “Lower P.” A 
full fleet accounting is included in Appendix O. 
• Maximum Ship Constraint: There are impositions on the number of 
ships which can realistically be constructed in the given time frame. The 
Lower-P for each ship class plus the maximum number of that class of 
ship which can be constructed by 2035 gives us the maximum number of 
each class of ship that could feasibly be serving in 2035. This number is 
referred to as “Upper-P”   
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• Budget constraint: The modified SCN budget will not be exceeded by 
the objective function when the mathematical model is selecting platforms 
to maximize the fleet’s capabilities. A further discussion of SCN budget 
constraints is included in Table 4 and Appendix L. 
• Set-Based design derived requirement: The SBD implementation is 
based on the definition of “Set” established for this study. Each set has a 
requirement for each warfare area to meet a certain level of capability. 
This level of capability is expressed as a relation to the 2017 fleet’s 
capabilities. For example; a set which predicts a BMD heavy future may 
not requires as much focus on the surface warfare domain. Such a set may 
necessitate a 15% increase in BMD capabilities when compared to the 
BMD capabilities of 2017’s fleet. At the same time, an SUW capability 
which is only 80% of the 2017 fleet’s capability may suffice. This is 
expressed as a BMD requirement of 1.15 and an SUW requirement of 0.8. 
These parameters are defined for every warfare area and every set which is 
being considered. The objective function solution picks the most stringent 
requirement (highest number) for each warfare area across all sets 
considered and sets this level as the minimum acceptable performance for 
that warfare area. This method seeks to build a fleet which meets 
minimum required capabilities in all warfare areas for all of the sets being 
considered.  
• Set-Based design compromise factor: It is possible to input values into 
the spreadsheet in which an acceptable fleet cannot be designed within the 
given constraints. A simple “compromise factor” has been built into the 
objective function which can be used to scale the SBD derived 
requirements to a level where a solution can be computed. If there simply 
is not enough money to build enough ships to deal with every set being 
considered, replacing the default compromise factor of 1 with a number 
less than 1 like 0.9 reduces all of the SBD derived warfare area 
requirements by 10% (0.85 would indicate a 15% reduction etc.) in an 
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attempt to establish a feasible problem to solve. This compromise factor 
can be replaced with any number to tailor the output and find the best 
possible answer to the many possible sets considered. This is effectively 
saying “With the given constraints, a 90% solution to all of the possible 
situations we may face in the future is the best we can do.” 
 
Optimization (Integer Linear Program) 
 
Indices: 
p = Platform 
r = Warfare Area (BMD, STW, SUW, AAW, ASW, EW, MIW, AMW) (8 total) 
p ∈ S (SCN Platforms) 
p ∈ A (Non-SCN Platforms) 
 
Decision Variables: 
Xp = Number of Platforms p 
 
Data: 
 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑊𝑊= Cost of platform p (units = FY$2015) 
 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶= $164 billion 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑊𝑊,𝐴𝐴= Capability (MOP contribution) of platform p (warfare area index r, 
platforms contribution to each warfare area) 
 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝐴𝐴= Minimum capability (MOP contribution) of warfare area contribution, r 
 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝐴𝐴=Maximum capability (MOP contribution) of warfare area contribution, r 
𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵𝐿𝐿𝑊𝑊 = Minimum number of platforms in 2035 (number of platforms from 
2017 still commissioned in 2035) 
𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝐵𝐵𝐿𝐿𝑊𝑊= Maximum number of platforms in 2035 [𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵𝐿𝐿𝑊𝑊  plus the number of 
platforms that can be built between 2017 and 2035 (18 years)] 
 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝑊𝑊= Maximum number of aircraft deck space available on platform, p 
 
Objective Function (Main):  
 
1. Maximize:  ∑ 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑊𝑊,𝐴𝐴𝑋𝑋𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊,𝐴𝐴  
Subject To: 
 Between minimum ship count and maximum construction rate 
  𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵𝐿𝐿𝑊𝑊 ≤  𝑋𝑋𝑊𝑊 ≤  𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝐵𝐵𝐿𝐿𝑊𝑊 for each p 
 Capability greater than minimum defined 
  ∑ 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑊𝑊,𝐴𝐴𝑋𝑋𝑊𝑊 ≥ 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝐴𝐴  𝑓𝑓𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿 𝐵𝐵𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒ℎ 𝐿𝐿𝑊𝑊   
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 Capability less than maximum defined 
  ∑ 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑊𝑊,𝐴𝐴𝑋𝑋𝑊𝑊≤ 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝐴𝐴  𝑓𝑓𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿 𝐵𝐵𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒ℎ 𝐿𝐿𝑊𝑊  
 Flight Deck Constraint 
  ∑ 𝑋𝑋𝑊𝑊 ≤𝑊𝑊∈𝐴𝐴 ∑ 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝑊𝑊𝑋𝑋𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊∈𝑆𝑆  
 Budget Constraint 
  ∑ 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑊𝑊𝑋𝑋𝑊𝑊 ≤ 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝑊𝑊  
 Integer Constraint 
  𝑋𝑋𝑊𝑊 ≥ 0 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝐵𝐵 𝐼𝐼𝑚𝑚𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐿𝐿 
 
The main objective function expresses the fleet’s MOPs in all warfare areas, r, 
simultaneously, in order to select a number for each platform, p, while keeping all 
parameters within the listed constraints. In other words, the main objective function 
selects the numbers and types of platform most optimal to accomplish the requirements 
defined by the sets for an alternative fleet architecture in the 2035 timeframe.  
 
Objective Function (Individual Warfare Areas): 
2. Maximize: ∑ 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑊𝑊,𝐴𝐴𝑋𝑋𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊  𝑓𝑓𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿 𝐵𝐵𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒ℎ 𝐿𝐿 
Subject To: ∑ 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑊𝑊,𝐴𝐴𝑋𝑋𝑊𝑊 ≤ 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝐴𝐴  𝑓𝑓𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿 𝐵𝐵𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒ℎ 𝐿𝐿𝑊𝑊   
  ∑ 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑊𝑊,𝐴𝐴𝑋𝑋𝑊𝑊 ≥ 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝐴𝐴  𝑓𝑓𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿 𝐵𝐵𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒ℎ 𝐿𝐿𝑊𝑊  
   𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵𝐿𝐿𝑊𝑊 ≤  𝑋𝑋𝑊𝑊 ≤  𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝐵𝐵𝐿𝐿𝑊𝑊 𝑓𝑓𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿 𝐵𝐵𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒ℎ 𝑈𝑈 
   ∑ 𝑋𝑋𝑊𝑊 ≤𝑊𝑊∈𝐴𝐴 ∑ 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝑊𝑊𝑋𝑋𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊∈𝑆𝑆  
   ∑ 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑊𝑊𝑋𝑋𝑊𝑊 ≤ 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝑊𝑊  
𝑋𝑋𝑊𝑊 ≥ 0 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝐵𝐵 𝐼𝐼𝑚𝑚𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐿𝐿 
 
The individual warfare area objective function maximizes the fleet’s MOP in only 
one warfare area, r. This optimization problem is solved eight times, one for each warfare 
area. The optimization serves to assist in defining the feasible regions for each warfare 
area by establishing the optimal data point that defines the most capability (MOP) for the 
warfare area. In other words, the individual warfare area objective function defines the 
upper right corner of the feasibility region in each warfare area (see next chapter). 




A. SET-BASED DESIGN RESULTS 
As previously described, feasibility regions are established for each warfare area 
in order to bound the requirements (MOPs) for the fleet within the budget constraint, the 
optimal capability (maxr) and the minimum capability (minr) for each warfare area. These 
feasibility regions are the requirements intervals that consummate SBD for this study. 
The resulting feasibility regions for each warfare area are provided below. 
The entire feasibility region has a budget ceiling constraint of $164,346 
(FY$M2035). This number is significantly reduced considering the original SCN of 
$257,000 (FY$M2035). Outfitting, Overhaul, Refueling, Support ships, and Port 
Facilities Ships, all contribute to the drastic reduction in budget.  
Table 4.   Total SCN Budget Accounting. Source: Assistant Secretary of the 
Navy Finance and Comptroller (2017) 
Cost $M  
257,000 Total SCN Budget 
37,000 CVN Refueling and Overhaul 
4,550 Expeditionary Sea Base (ESB) costs 
6,400 LHA(R) Upgrade Plan 
2,000 Expeditionary Fast Transport (8) 
13,650 TAO Refueling (21) 
1,350 Towing, Salvage, Rescue (15) 
4,400 Moored Training Ship (4) 
2,030 Landing Craft (58) 
11,700 ‘Outfitting’ ($650M/yr) to 2035  
7,140 Ship to Shore Connector (102) 
990 Service Craft (90) 
1,400 LCAC (landing craft air cushion) Service Life Extension Program 
44 Yard Patrol Service Life Extension Program (12) 
164,000 Remaining Budget  
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The budget is not actually reduced; however, the SEA-26 Capstone addresses 
only what we consider fighting ships. In order to observe what a future fleet would look 
like we had to reduce the budget to account for the “support ships and activities” or our 
future fleet’s capabilities would be largely inflated and inaccurate. 
1. Strike Warfare 
The most-constraining set for STW is Set 3, providing a constraint of 5,387 
targets engaged per 24-hour period. Sets 1, 2, and 4 are not included as bounds for the 
green feasibility region because Set 3 is the most limiting set. The calculated maximum 
capability is found to be 7,710 targets engaged per 24-hour period, thus yielding the 
green feasibility region depicted below.  
 
Figure 5.  STW Feasibility Region 
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2. Anti-Air Warfare 
The most-constraining set for AAW is Set 2, providing a constraint of 3,119 
targets per 24-hour period. Sets 1, 3, and 4 are not included as bounds for the green 
feasibility region because Set 2 is the most limiting set. The calculated maximum 
capability is found to be 4,799 targets engaged per 24-hour period, thus yielding the 
green feasibility region depicted below. 
 
Figure 6.  AAW Feasibility Region 
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3. Surface Warfare 
The most-constraining set for SUW is Set 2, providing a constraint of 5,833 
targets per 24-hour period. Sets 1, 3, and 4 are not included as bounds for the green 
feasibility region because Set 2 is the most limiting set. The calculated maximum 
capability is derived as 8,333 targets engaged per 24-hour period, thus yielding the 
feasibility region depicted below. 
 
Figure 7.  SUW Feasibility Region 
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4. Anti-Submarine Warfare 
The most-constraining set for ASW is Set 2, providing a constraint of 2,888 
targets per 24-hour period. Sets 1, 3, and 4 are not included as bounds for the green 
feasibility region because Set 2 is the most limiting set. The calculated maximum 
capability is derived as 4,813 targets engaged per 24-hour period, thus yielding the 
feasibility region depicted below. 
 
 
Figure 8.  ASW Feasibility Region 
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5. Electronic Warfare 
The most-constraining set for EW is Set 4, providing a constraint of 405 
electronic-attack capable assets. Sets 1, 2, and 3 are not included as bounds for the green 
feasibility region because Set 4 is the most limiting set. The calculated maximum 
capability is derived as 476 electronic-attack capable assets, thus yielding the green 
feasibility region depicted below. 
 
Figure 9.  EW Feasibility Region 
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6. Anti-Mine Warfare 
The most-constraining set for MIW is Set 4, providing a constraint of 230 mines 
cleared per 24-hour period. Sets 1, 2, and 3 are not included as bounds for the green 
feasibility region because Set 4 is the most limiting set. The calculated maximum 
capability is derived as 288 mines cleared per 24-hour period, thus yielding the green 
feasibility region depicted below. 
 
Figure 10.  MIW Feasibility Region 
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7. Amphibious Warfare 
The most-constraining set for AMW is Set 4, providing a constraint of 17 MEU’s 
delivered. Sets 1, 2, and 3 are not included as bounds for the green feasibility region 
because Set 4 is the most limiting set. The calculated maximum capability was derived as 
20 MEU’s, thus yielding the green feasibility region depicted below. 
 
Figure 11.  AMW Feasibility Region 
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8. BMD Warfare 
The most-constraining set for BMD is Set 3, providing a constraint of 2,063 
targets engaged per 24-hour period. Sets 1, 2, and 4 are not included as bounds for the 
green feasibility region because Set 3 is the most limiting set. The calculated maximum 
capability is derived as 3,438 targets engaged per 24-hour period, thus yielding the green 
feasibility region depicted below. 
 
Figure 12.  BMD Feasibility Region 
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9. The Future Fleet
Optimizing for all 8 warfare areas simultaneously yields the platform allocation 
depicted in Table 5. Military sealift-command (MSC) ships are included for total 
accountability, but were not part of the $164B fiscal constraint. 
Table 5.  2035 Platform Allocation with UxVs 



















TERN (See Appendix 
J) 
288 
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Ship Class Number in 2035 
Fire Scout 278 
Triton 10 
XLDUUV 10 
MSC (Not accounted 
for with AMW) 
88 




10 UUVs   
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Figure 13 depicts the capability distribution of the 2035 fleet against a normalized 
2017 fleet. 
 
Figure 13.  Fleet Capability Chart 
The resulting 2035 fleet yields a fleet with marginal decreases in SUW and ASW, 
marginal increases in AAW, STW, and BMD, and marked improvements in AMW, EW, 
and MIW. Optimizing for all warfare areas resulted in the following MOPs. 




Figure 14.  6,676 STW Targets per 24 Hours 
 
 
Figure 15.  4,636 AAW Targets per 24 Hours 




Figure 16.  7,645 SUW Targets per 24 Hours 
 
Figure 17.  4,241 ASW Targets per 24 Hours 
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Figure 18.  451 Electronic-Attack Capable Assets 
Figure 19.  288 Mines Cleared per 24 Hours 




Figure 20.  20 MEUs Delivered 
 




B. RESULTANT MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS 
Our final analysis yielded the following MOEs: 
1. MOE 1 – Domain Grid Factor (All Domain Access)
The final fleet’s domain grid factor, 𝜂𝜂, scores a 3.84, with the air domain factor, 
𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴
𝑊𝑊𝐴𝐴
, scoring 1.00, the surface domain factor, 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆
𝑊𝑊𝑆𝑆
, scoring 0.97, and the subsurface 
domain factor, 𝑆𝑆𝑈𝑈
𝑊𝑊𝑈𝑈
 , scoring 1.87. Individually, SA = 1.00, SS = 0.97, SU = 0.11, WA = 
1.00, Ws = 1.00, and WU = 0.06. Given the criteria listed, several factors do not meet 0.8 
or greater. Specifically, SU is lesser than 0.8. This is due to the fact that the total area of 
responsibility for subsurface sensor coverage does not equate to the required surface 
sensor coverage (which was used as the general quantity for measuring all domains); 
therefore, a subsurface sensor coverage ratio lesser than 0.8 is acceptable. Ocean 
bathymetry limits the amount of space that undersea platforms can occupy and sense 
compared to the surface domain. The subsurface weapon coverage ratio, WU , is less than 
0.8 due to similar reasons; the fleet architecture does not allow sufficient weapons 
coverage to cover a majority of the undersea domain. The criteria listed are not hard 
requirements, but may be modified based on stakeholder needs. 
2. MOE 2 – Cumulative Deterrence Coverage (Deterrence)
The 2035 fleet scores a cumulative deterrence coverage of 6.23, making it a 6 
times greater deterrent force than today’s fleet. 
3. MOE 3 – Weapon Density (Sea Control)
The 2035 fleet’s weapon density scores 0.0077, making it equivalent to today’s 
score of 0.0077. 
4. MOE 4 – Cumulative Power Projection (Power Projection)
 The 2035 fleet’s power projection score of 1.35 signifies it has 35% more 
platforms underway than today’s fleet. 
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5. MOE 5 – Fleet Flexibility 
The fleet has a flexibility of 8, signifying every fleet commander is fully flexible 
across all 8 warfare areas. 
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VII. UNMANNED SYSTEMS
A. COST AND FLEET CAPABILITIES ANALYSIS GIVEN THE ADDITION 
OF UNMANNED SYSTEMS 
Under manning and subsequently reduced capabilities in the U.S. military has 
been a problem that has plagued the U.S. services for many years. While in the past 
increased recruiting efforts and bumps in patriotism due to international conflicts have 
been enough to fill this manning and capabilities gap, today these efforts simply will not 
suffice. In the past 20 years proposals from government and department of defense have 
suggested filling the growing manning and capabilities gap with unmanned systems, 
namely ones that can be made cheap and replaceable.  
Since the tasking statement for SEA-26 does not specifically require the use of 
Unmanned Systems in our fleet architecture we have taken the liberty of running our fleet 
architecture model with and without UxVs in order to compare the two results and 
conduct sensitivity analysis. 
Our model without UxVs, as it always does, makes sure to stay within the given 
SCN budget when considering a fleet architecture for 2035. Figure 22 displays the results 
with all constraints previously explained in the methodology section. Of note is the 
Objective Cell that scored 1.246 which is a relative term that considers the assigned 
weight given to each warfare area and the current capabilities as of 2017. Individual 
warfare areas relative to today’s navy’s capabilities are displayed in the “Relative Score” 
row. 




Figure 22.  Fleet Capabilities W/O UxVs 
Figure 23 displays the result when adding UxVs as an option to increase fleet 
capabilities. As is clearly evident in the results, the addition of UxVs increases the 
Navy’s warfare capabilities. However, the reader must be reminded that UAVs are not 
included in the SCN budget. Funding for all of the UxV platforms in this model comes 
from several procurement sources. The 19% increase in overall fleet capability must be 
funded by sources other than the existing SCN budget. Fleet Capabilities With UxVs 
 
Figure 23.  Fleet Capabilities with UxVs 
While gaining a 19% fighting capability increase is significant, we also consider 
how this increase will be manufactured. Since it is not unreasonable for defense 
contractors to build and supply the Navy with large numbers of TERN and Fire Scout 
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UAVs using existing manufacturing lines, we placed an unlimited upper bound for these 
platforms in order to give a larger feasibility region. However, an infinite number of 
UAVs is not realistic so we constrained the number of TERNs and Fire Scouts by the 
maximum number of ships with UAV carrying capable flight decks. The other UxVs 
considered by the model are the Triton (UAV) and the extra-large displacement 
unmanned underwater vehicle (XLDUUV) which we bound by build rate of 10 by 
2035.  Given these constraints the figure below outlines UxV numbers considered 
optimal by our fleet architecture.  
In the end we can see that the overall cost tradeoff for an increase of 19% in fleet 
capabilities is 5.7 billion dollars. To put this in perspective, this is roughly the cost of one 
SSBN or half the cost of one CVN. While improving fleet capabilities by 19%, this  
$5.7 billion cost is not an SCN expense, and does not result in an additional monetary 
expense within our model. 
 
Figure 24.  Numbers and Cost of UxVs 
Figure 25 is the side-by-side visual comparison of possible future U.S. Navy fleet 
capabilities without and with UxVs respectively. Most notable is the drastic increase to 
Electronic Warfare and minimal, yet impactful, increases to AAW and ASW when 
adding UxVs to the 2035 fleet architecture. 




Figure 25.  a) Fleet W/O UxVs b) Fleet with UxVs 
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VIII. THE FLEET ARCHITECTURE
A. NUMBER OF TOTAL VESSELS 
307: This number includes 297 manned and 10 unmanned, surface and sub-
surface fighting ships. 
B. NUMBER OF MANNED VEHICLES 
297: This number includes only 271 manned surface and 26 sub-surface ships. 
C. NUMBER OF UNMANNED VEHICLES 
586: This number includes zero unmanned surface, 10 unmanned sub-surface, and 
576 unmanned air systems.  
D. ACTIVITIES OF SHIP LIFE CYCLES 
The length of the typical ship life cycle and training cycle has changed dozens of 
times over the last half century. This study is not concerned with the lifespan of a typical 
navy ship of 30 to 50 years, but is concerned with how a ship prepares for and recovers 
from a 6- to 9-month deployment.  
The typical optimal fleet response plan (O-FRP) consists of maintenance, basic 
unit level training, integrated training, and sustainment. The plan “has been developed to 
enhance the stability and predictability for our Sailors and families by aligning carrier 
strike group assets to a new 36-month training and deployment cycle” as seen in Figure 
26, according to USFF/CPFINST 3000.15 series, there are approximately 238 
inspections, certifications, assessments, and visits (ICAVS) events that take time out of a 
ship’s training cycle (U.S. Fleet Forces Command 2014).  




Figure 26.  Current Optimized Fleet Response Plan (OFRP): Number of Months for 
Each Activity in a Training and Deployment Cycle. Source: U.S. Fleet 
Forces Command (2014). 
Additionally, the O-FRP does not take into account cycle inefficiencies, schedule 
changes, and delays.  There are also many certification and inspection bodies within the 
Navy that are often redundant in the same training cycle such as Afloat Training Group, 
Defense Readiness Reporting System-Navy, Type Commander Material Inspection, 
along with a myriad of other organizations.  
With an assumed operational availability (Ao) of 0.25 and average deployment 




𝐷𝐷𝐵𝐵𝑈𝑈𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝑚𝑚𝐵𝐵𝑚𝑚𝐶𝐶 +  𝐷𝐷𝐵𝐵𝑈𝑈𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝑚𝑚𝐵𝐵𝑚𝑚𝐶𝐶 𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵𝑒𝑒𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵𝐿𝐿𝐷𝐷 
 
0.25 = 𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝐷𝐷𝑚𝑚𝐴𝐴𝑚𝑚𝐷𝐷𝑚𝑚𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷 =
8 𝑚𝑚𝐶𝐶 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑈𝑈𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝑚𝑚𝐵𝐵𝑚𝑚𝐶𝐶
8 𝑚𝑚𝐶𝐶 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑈𝑈𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝑚𝑚𝐵𝐵𝑚𝑚𝐶𝐶 +  24 𝑚𝑚𝐶𝐶 𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵𝑒𝑒𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵𝐿𝐿𝐷𝐷  
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This study also recommends combining redundant ICAVs and abolishing the 
individual certification bodies and placing them under one Navy certification and training 
agency that will coordinate with the Board of Inspection and Survey. A proposed 
“certification period” will mitigate the schedule delays and inspection inefficiencies. The 
new ship cycle, or Improved Optimal Fleet Response Plan (IO-FRP), provides a realistic 
and predictable ship schedule is depicted in Figure 27. 
 
Figure 27.  Proposed IOFRP Showing Number of Months in Deployment and 
Training Cycle 








In this work, the SEA-26 cohort leveraged systems engineering fundamentals and 
designed an alternative fleet architecture to the programmed force for the 2030–2035 
timeframe. The team considered the anticipated dynamics of future naval combat, 
emerging technologies, and potential advisories trends in systems that threaten U.S. sea 
control. To the maximum extent possible, we investigated and used SBD to meet 
capability, capacity, and mission set requirements articulated in “A Design for 
Maintaining Maritime Superiority” (Department of the Navy 2016) and “A Cooperative 
Strategy for 21st Century Seapower” (Department of the Navy 2015). The fleet 
architecture includes the numbers, kinds, and sizes of vessels, numbers and types of 
associated manned and unmanned vehicles, and the basic capabilities of each of those 
platforms. Finally, the team assessed fleet architecture and design against the 
programmed force costs, and their ability to satisfy national and maritime strategy. 
B. THE FINAL FLEET ARCHITECTURE 
The resulting fleet architecture is presented in the Results section and has been 
reproduced at the bottom of this section for reference. The results clearly articulate the 
numbers and types of platforms in the ‘optimum solution’ generated by our main 
optimization model. It should be emphasized that this represents a feasible and optimal 
solution to the modeling of a very complex problem of a future fleet architecture. As 
such, it is valid under the clearly stated assumptions and measures of effectiveness and 
technical performance. Final recommendations should include a number of additional 
assumptions and measures, ranging from economical to social and political constraints. 
Nevertheless, the fleet architecture design methodology developed is very flexible and 
allows for a large number of studies to be completed providing rational guidance to future 
decision makers. Therefore, to stop the analysis at the hull count is incomplete and misses 
many important lessons from the exercise. Following are key findings about the fleet 
architecture and the fleet created by our work.  
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Reduced Emphasis on CVNs. While the capability to project power from the 
flight deck of a CVN is not in question, the cost associated with CVN construction and 
manning is. The objective function chose not to construct additional CVNs and instead 
divert the considerable cost savings to other types of warships to create additional fleet 
assets. For all the power and might of the carrier air wing, it can only be in one place at a 
time, and a more numerically larger fleet has its own value that is recognized by the main 
objective function. 
High procurement of CG and DDG types of vessels. The main objective function 
recognizes the multi-mission capability and flexibility of these vessels, and it chooses to 
maximize their procurement.  
‘Gold Plated’ platforms like DDG-1000, or extremely expensive platforms like 
submarines are not favored by the spreadsheet algorithm. While these are incredible 
national assets as modeled, their high cost is difficult to justify in comparison to less 
expensive conventional warships. However, this does not necessarily indicate that they 
are unnecessary. Rather, the lesson learned is that extremely expensive platforms must 
justify and quantify their value to the fleet in a different manner than their less expensive 
counterparts. Stealth has a value all its own, and this project did not attempt to quantify 
the advantages or disadvantages of low observable technologies and techniques. The 
choice to invest in high end stealth technologies for future platforms should be done at 
the individual program level in recognition of the considerable costs and possible 
advantages or disadvantages such technology adds to the system in question. 
Expanded rolls for the Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG) and the CVL concept. 
The addition of new, more capable VTOL aircraft and UAVs has the potential to re-birth 
the CVL concept within the existing framework of our ESGs. The introduction of the F-
35B Lightening II fighter aircraft to LHD and LHA amphibious assault ships will 
significantly increase their power projection. Additionally, more capable UAVs operating 
off relatively small amphibious ships (LPD, LSD) will provide large improvements in 
their strike and EW capabilities beyond those currently provided by the primarily manned 
helicopter detachments. 
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Cruiser-Destroyer (CRUDES) and aviation assets. While the current MH60R is an 
excellent platform for operation aboard CRUDES class ships, it faces limitations imposed 
by its manning compliment. Continuous flight operations can also significantly impact 
ship operations with frequent stops for fueling and/or crew changes. A 12-hour capable 
UAV could provide the CRUDES navy with expanded aviation support while the manned 
helicopter can undergo maintenance and crew rest takes place. 
Table 6.  2035 Platform Allocation with UxVs (Repeated) 




















Ship Class Number in 2035 
TERN 288 








10 UUVs   
C. ANALYSIS OF MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS 
MOE 1, Domain Grid Factor, equates to 1.95. The sensor and weapon coverages 
are calculated from the platforms that are underway at any given time. Therefore, the 
sensor coverages in all domains are 1.95 times larger than the weapon coverages in all 
domains. In other words, the 2035 fleet can see nearly twice more than it can shoot. 
MOE 2, Cumulative Deterrence, equated to 6.23. The collective ratio of BMD-
capable platforms, STW-capable platforms, ship platforms, and submarine platforms in 
2035 deployed and underway is 6.23 times more than the assumed ratios of these 
platforms that are assumed to be deployed and underway in 2017. Additionally, all MOE 
2 criteria are met.  
MOE 3, Weapon Density, equated to 0.010. This represents the distribution of the 
2035 fleet architecture’s SUW MOP over the total area of responsibility for all numbered 
fleets. Though no associated criterion was required for MOE 3, 0.010 is an improvement 
over the Weapon Density for the 2017 fleet architecture, 0.008. However, the individual 
weapon density of 5th Fleet was 0.180, which did not meet the criterion of 0.900. The low 
weapon density can be attributed to the low capacity of support facilities in the 5th Fleet 
AOR that results in a low presence of SUW-capable assets in the 5th Fleet AOR. 
67 
MOE 4, Cumulative Power Projection, equated to 1.35. The collective ratio of 
STW-capable platforms, AMW-capable platforms, and submarine platforms in 2035 
deployed and underway is 1.35 times more than the assumed ratios of these platforms 
that are assumed to be deployed and underway in 2017. Additionally, all MOE 4 criteria 
are met.  
MOE 5, Fleet Flexibility, equated 8. The manual allocation of assets of the fleet 
architecture to each numbered fleet resulted in the ability of each fleet to accomplish all 
eight warfare areas of concern in this study with the assets provided. 
D. TECHNICAL RISKS WITH THE FINAL FLEET ARCHITECTURE 
When considering the fleet architecture, there are a few primary concerns one of 
which is the technical risks involved with new or developing systems. The fleet that 
SEA-26 designed requires a large number of UxVs. As of today, UxVs are inherently a 
technical risk;, however, in order to minimize the risk in the 2035 fleet we restricted the 
fleet architecture options to highly developed, matured or already deployed UxVs. 
Although some of these platforms have not been tested in prolonged deployment or 
combat conditions, we have assumed that the next 18 years of development to FY2035 
will provide ample time for additional development. 
E. FURTHER RESEARCH AREAS 
The analysis presented in this report analyzes the future in the broadest possible 
terms. The actual construction of the fleet requires much more detailed analysis of each 
system, and its integration into the future fighting force as a synergistic component of our 
overall capability. Further analysis also needs to consider additional MOEs and MOPs 
such as asset vulnerability and synergistic effects of multiple platforms operating in 
mutual support. 
F. CONCLUSION 
Designing a fleet architecture for the 2030–2035 timeframe is no easy task. 
Having a team with members of diverse warfare backgrounds contributed to the 
effectiveness of SBD. The requirements within the scope of fleet design were constantly 
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evolving as different aspects of fleet design were uncovered. As mentioned earlier, this 
study describes a rational approach to a very complex problem within well documented 
technical and mathematical constraints. It can be used to provide guidance to decision 
makers with regards to proper fleet architectures for the future. 
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APPENDIX A.  WARFARE POINTS 
We define warfare points as the total capabilities a platform solely provides to a 
24-hour engagement window within a warfare area. All platforms subject to this analysis 
were assigned “Warfare Points” with which to use for their comparisons. These points 
intend to compare the total capability each platform can bring to a 24-hour fight. Points 
are only compared within each warfare area, and not across warfare areas. For example; a 
good question to ask while assigning these values is; “how many DDGs does it take to 
match the strike power of a CVN?” Do NOT consider “why there so many more strike 
points compared to the number of amphibious points?”  
Below we provide the warfare points we assign all platforms to all warfare areas. 
The warfare points for each platform are determined from their number of onboard 
systems, assets, and capabilities. 
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LPD-17 60% VLS for Strike 
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APPENDIX  B. CARRIER STRIKE GROUPS (CSG) 
A carrier strike group (CSG) consists of a Nimitz or Ford class carrier (CVN), one 
Ticonderoga class Cruiser (CG), two to four Arleigh Burke class guided missile 
destroyers (DDGs), zero to one fast attack submarine (SSN), and one supply ship (T-AO/
T-AOE).  
On board the CVN, a carrier air wing (CVW) is embarked during the CSGs 
deployment. A CVW consists of approximately 70 aircraft including 40 strike aircraft 
among four strike fighter squadrons (VFAs), 5 electronic attack aircraft in one electronic 
attack squadron (VAQ), four airborne early warning aircraft in one carrier airborne early 
warning squadron (VAW), eight helicopters in one helicopter sea combat squadron 
(HSC), eleven helicopters in one helicopter maritime strike squadron (HSM), and two 
logistics aircraft in one fleet logistics support squadron (VRC). 
We assume a mix of Nimitz class (CVN-68) and Ford class (CVN-78) aircraft 
carriers are present in the 2030–2035 fleet architecture. As of 2017, there are only two 
additional Ford class carriers scheduled to be commissioned: USS John F. Kennedy 
(CVN-79) in 2020 and USS Enterprise (CVN-80) in 2025 to replace USS Nimitz (CVN-
68) and USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN-69) respectively (O’Rourke 2017).
The key effectiveness of the CSG is the ability to use maneuverability by 
allowing the tactical flexibility and “stealthiness” to deny targeting to an adversary. 
Meanwhile, the CSG concept relies upon keeping the assets and ships of the strike group 
concentrated in order to conduct “power projection” operations from an airfield at sea or 
from vertically launched land attack cruise missiles. The carrier serves as the capital ship 
while the other ships in the strike group bear the responsibility of supporting and 
protecting her. 
Future capabilities of the CVN include the employment of unmanned aircraft. 
This implies that the future CVW may include mixed squadrons of manned and 
unmanned platforms. 
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APPENDIX C.  AMPHIBIOUS READY GROUP (ARG) 
According to General James F. Amos, USMC, “Forward-deployed amphibious 
forces remain a uniquely critical and capable component of our national strategic 
demands presence crisis response, power projection and theater security cooperation 
(U.S. Marines Corps 2017).” The amphibious ready group (ARG) consists of an 
amphibious assault ship (LHD/LHA), amphibious transport dock ship (LPD), dock 
landing ship (LSD), two Arleigh Burke class guided missile destroyers (DDGs), and one 
supply ship (T-AO/T-AOE) 
Embarked on the various large amphibious ships will be a marine expeditionary 
unit (MEU). Each MEU includes a ground combat element of a Marine infantry battalion, 
aviation combat element, battalion sized logistics element, and a command element.  “An 
amphibious operation is a military operation launched from the sea by an amphibious 
force (AF) to conduct landing force (LF) operations within the littorals (U.S. Marine 
Corps 2017).” As the focus of the ARG is amphibious operations, it should be 
categorized differently from the other warfare area-centric concepts. 
The 2016 Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) Study (Clark 
and Sloman 2016) recommends additional San Antonio class LPDs and America class 
LHAs. Additionally, the authors recommend three additional LHAs and eight LPDs be 
stationed forward as part of the Forward Deployed Naval Force (FDNF) in the Pacific, 
Mediterranean and Arabian Gulf. While these LPDs and LHAs are assigned to the 
expeditionary fighting force, additional LPDs could be repurposed and re-designated as 
CVLs. The combat potential of an LPD operating F-35 Lightening II aircraft gives 
considerable strike potential to a ship not usually considered to have any strike capability.  
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APPENDIX D.  LIGHT CARRIER GROUP (CLG) CONCEPT 
The light carrier group (CLG) concept explores the potential use of repurposing a 
San Antonio class (LPD-17) from an Amphibious Transport Dock Ship into a Light UAV 
Carrier (CVL-17). The CVL would serve as a high value unit capable of launching, 
recovering, commanding, and maintaining several squadrons of UAVs. Three to four 
DDGs or LCSs would serve as supporting composite warfare commanders.  
As the cost of a manned strike aircraft can be many times higher than that of an 
unmanned drone, the use of UAVs in military applications carries much less monetary 
risk. Not only are the UAVs a cost-effective manned aircraft replacement, the CVL will 
be a cost-effective UAV carrier in place of a larger and more expensive Nimitz or Ford 
class CVN. The CLG would be deployed to regions where air, communications relays, 
and ISR assets are required, but do not require the amount strike and command and 
control capability that a CSG and CAW provides. The DDGs or LCSs assigned to the 
CLG would augment the AAW, ASW, SUW, and strike warfare areas.  
The existing LPD-17 class will provide an outstanding hull for conversion into a 
CVL-17 class carrier equipped with VTOL UAVs. Compartments dedicated to troop 
berthing and vehicle storage will be converted to UAV storage racks to optimize the 
number of aircraft embarked (Bradley, Daniel, Hanks, and McKelvey 2009). The 
Landing Force Operations Center will be converted to UAV controller console stations. 
Launch and recovery systems will need to be added, but need not be robust and dynamic 
of those onboard Nimitz and Ford class carriers. 
UAVs embarked would be Group 1 (Small), Group 2 (Medium), and Group 3 
(Large) types of fixed and rotary winged unmanned aerial systems (UASs). The 
composition and organization of a Light Carrier Air Wing would mimic that of a full 
Carrier Air Wing (CVW), but would focus on ISR and communications based platforms. 
They would include, but not be limited to unmanned strike fighter squadrons (VFUs), 
unmanned electronic attack squadrons (VQUs), unmanned airborne early warning/ISR 
Squadrons (VWUs), unmanned communications relay squadrons (VCUs), unmanned 
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helicopter combat squadrons (HSUs), and helicopter maritime strike squadrons (HMUs). 
Additionally, a manned helicopter sea combat squadron detachment (HSC) will be 
embarked for search and rescue and anti-terrorism/force protection requirements.   
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APPENDIX E.  UNMANNED UNDERWATER GROUP (UUG) 
CONCEPT 
The anti-submarine warfare continuous trail unmanned vessel (ACTUV) is an 
UUV with the capability to track diesel electric submarines (Walan 2017). As of 2017, 
this maritime system is able to deploy for several months and cover thousands of miles 
under sparse supervision (Walan 2017). While the ACTUV’s primary mission is ASW, 
its mission set it expendable for a variety of configurations to potentially include SUW, 
STW, and AAW. A UUG would consist of 1–2 DDG and 4 ACTUV, Supply Ship, 
support ship specifically for ACTUV Maintenance/Repair as needed. Maritime Patrol P-3 
or P-8 Squadrons (VP) have the ability to augment the UUG as required.   
UUGs can potentially alleviate the need for several Arleigh Burke class, Freedom 
class, and Independence class vessels to conduct ASW operations and patrols so that their 
capability is not restricted to one warfare area. ASW operations require a large sensor 
coverage to weapons coverage ratio as detection and classification of adversary 
submarines are far more important than an overwhelming amount of ordnance as 
submarines typically operate independently. Therefore, only one or two weapons capable 
manned platforms are required in this type of operating environment.  
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APPENDIX F.  BATTLESHIP BATTLE GROUP CONCEPT 
The battleship was the first rate ship of the line from the late 1800s until the 
middle of World War II. The Battle of Midway Sea proved the importance of carrier 
based strike aircraft. However, in the height of the missile age, the risks associated with 
Nimitz or Ford class Carriers conducting strike operations and Arleigh Burke class 
destroyers conducting naval surface fire support (NSFS) in the range of coastal anti-ship 
cruise missile (ASCM) batteries are far too high (Honan 1984). A Zumwalt class DDG-
1000 reclassified as a battleship would reinforce and enhance the future fleet in two 
ways. First, a battleship armed with a railgun system with a notional range of 220 nm 
would alleviate the overtasked and overvalued Aegis ships so they will not have to 
conduct NSFS within 12nm offshore, well within coastal defense batteries (Freebird 
2017). Second, recognizing that battleship and its destroyer escorts equipped with a long 
range kinetic gun and tomahawk land attack cruise missiles (TLAMs) would increase the 
number of “Capital Ships” that the Navy could deploy to minor global “hotspots.” In an 
era of rising third-state threats, when strategic global crisis arises, the President will no 
longer have to ask questions like “Where is the nearest carrier?”  
A critical concept of Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) battleship tactics during the 
Pacific War was to use the largest possible gun to outrange the enemy. Extended weapon 
ranges allowed the IJN to strike the enemy before he could retaliate (Stille, 2014). 
Railguns will serve as the battlegroup’s main force strike weapon to render enemy 
ASCM batteries, missile interceptors, surface to air missile sites (SAMs), or anti-aircraft 
artillery (AAA) ineffective.   The vanguard force consisting of its Aegis destroyer escort 
force will conduct anti-air defense and conduct long-range TLAM strike operations. 
Additional considerations could include specific ranges for long range NSFS through the 
use of the Navy Rail Gun given a classification upgrade. 
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APPENDIX G.  DOD UAV CLASSIFICATION
Table 7.  DOD UAV Classification. Adapted from U.S. Army UAS Center for 
Excellence (2010). 





Group 1 Small 0-20 <1,200 Above Ground 
Level 
<100 
Group 2 Medium 21-55 <3,500 <250 
Group 3 Large <1320 <18,000 Mean Sea 
Level 
<250 
Group 4 Larger >1320 <18,000 Mean Sea 
Level 
Any airspeed 
Group 5 Largest >1320 >18,000 Any airspeed 
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APPENDIX H.  LCS FUTURE MISSION MODULE 
CONSIDERATIONS IN SBD 
The littoral combat ship (LCS) was designed to counter three main threats: small 
surface attack threats in the form of fast attack craft (FAC) and fast inshore attack craft 
(FIAC), diesel/electric submarine threats, and mine threats (Knowles 2016). mission 
modules (MM) custom tailored to these three threats allow for the LCS rapidly modify 
and shift its capabilities and equipment to meet a dynamic range of mission requirements. 
Additionally, the modular MM allow a single LCS platform to be quickly installed with a 
single specific MM that can be swapped out with another platform or stored ashore for 
future use. Each MM contains mission specific equipment, so the appropriate technology 
can be selected for the MM. These MMs are developed incrementally to allow changes as 
new technology becomes available (Knowles 2016).  
As of 2017, PMS 420, LCS MM, has proved initial operational capability for the 
SUW MM, technical evaluation for the Mine-Countermeasure MCM MM, and proof of 
concept for the ASW MM (PMS-420 2017). The SBD design methodology coincides 
directly with the LCS MM concept. Just as SBD allows for the design effort to 
fluctuating and defers a final decision, LCS MM allows for the empty mission bay to 
serve as the design space and defers the MM decision until the detailed mission 
requirements are defined and understood. Once a large number of alternative MMs are 
considered, unit commanders can analyze the design space from their own unique 
perspective and optimize their own design and commit to a MM. 
LCS is a focused-mission surface combatant to potentially replace our legacy 
small surface combatants; Oliver Hazard Perry-class Frigates, Avenger class MCMs, and 
patrol craft. The ship, independent of an embarked mission, package provides air warfare 
self-defense capability with anti-air missiles, a high rate of fire 57mm gun, 3D air search 
radar, electronic warfare systems, and decoys for electronic warfare (Stackley and 
Rowden 2016). With cost as a main constraint, assuming three MMs for a single platform 
greatly increases the capability and capacity of the fleet architecture.  
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APPENDIX I.  MEDIUM DISPLACEMENT UNMANNED 
SURFACE VESSEL MDUSV FUTURE CONSIDERATIONS IN SBD 
The MDUSV in an unmanned surface vessel designed to track submarines (Walan 
2017). The operational strategy of distributed lethality involves the process of employing 
all surface assets as surface combatants. The future of the MDUSV could possibly 
involve the employment of SUW and ASW offensive capabilities to enhance the manned 
platforms they support. With two areas on the deck of the MDUSV dedicated for 
additional mission capability, the Harpoon Block II Extended Range and deck mounted 
Anti-Submarine Rockets could be employed to significantly enhance the offensive 
capabilities.  
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APPENDIX J.  TERN FUTURE CONSIDERATIONS IN SBD 
The TERN UAV is a DARPA sponsored program to develop a VTOL ‘fixed 
wing’ type of aircraft to perform a variety of missions from helicopter capable warships. 
The DARPA website offers the following amplification; 
Tern is an advanced technology development program that seeks to 
design, develop, and demonstrate a medium-altitude long-endurance 
(MALE) unmanned aircraft system and related technologies that enable 
future launch, recovery, and operations from small ships. The program 
seeks to develop systems and technologies to enable a future air vehicle 
that could provide persistent ISR and strike capabilities beyond the limited 
range and endurance provided by existing helicopter platforms. (Drozeski 
2017) 
Tern seeks to enable on-demand, ship-based unmanned aircraft system 
(UAS) operations without extensive, time-consuming, and irreversible 
ship modifications. It would provide small ships with a “mission truck” 
that could transport ISR and strike payloads long distances from the host 
vessel. A modular architecture would enable field-interchangeable mission 
packages for both overland and maritime missions. It would be able to 
operate from multiple ship types in elevated sea states. (Drozeski 2017) 
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APPENDIX K.  XLDUUV FUTURE CONSIDERATIONS IN SBD 
The Extra-Large Displacement UUV (XLDUUV), is a 54-inch diameter UUV 
that can be launched from the pier or a large mission-specific mothership at sea (Eckstein 
2017). While current capabilities in MIW, ASW, and SUW have not been proven, the 
vision is for the XLDUUV’s potential contribution in stealth, endurance, and sensor 
capacity to alleviate the need for dedicated manned surface vessels and aircraft to 
conduct extensive ASW operations. 
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APPENDIX L.  ADDITIONAL BUDGETARY CONSIDERATIONS 
The Assistant Secretary of the Navy Finance and Comptroller (2017) reports the 
Department of the Navy (DON) budget maintains consistency with the overarching 
themes of the Department of Defense (DOD) budget including: 
• Sustain global demand for Naval Forces; 
• Continue readiness reset; 
• Recapitalize and modernize Naval Forces; 
• Address the competitive environment; 
o Fund high end fight and game changing capabilities; 
o Restore and increase modernization programs; 
o Retain counterterrorism/counterinsurgency competencies; 
• Improve cyber resilience; and 
• Focus on Responsible Military Spending (ASN Finance and Comptroller 2017). 
Maintaining a robust Fleet and adaptable Marine Corps requires investments in 
platforms and systems to address today’s wide-range of operations. Some major 
considerations to the main optimization model’s budget constraint include the following 
committed programs under shipbuilding and conversion, Navy. Additional: 
• (3) Zumwalt class DDG-1000s $13.5B total by 2022. 
• CVN refueling and overhaul programs $33.7B by 2024. Cost estimation growth 
$37.0B total by 2035 based upon anticipated fleet architecture and pace of CVN 
overhaul. 
• (7) Expeditionary sea dock (ESD) and Expeditionary Sea Base (ESB) cost $4.6B 
total by 2035.  
• (8) Expeditionary fast transport (EPF) cost $2.0B total by 2035. 
• (21) Fleet replenishment oiler (TAO) cost $13.7B total by 2035. 
• (15) Towing salvage and rescue ship (ATS) cost $1.4B total by 2035. 
• (2) Moored training ship cost $2.2B total by 2035. 
• (58) Landing craft utility (LCU-1700) cost $2.0B total by 2035. 
• Outfitting (Repairs, equipage, consumables, and allowances) cost $11.7B by 
2035. 
• (102) Ship-to-shore connector (SSC), Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCAC) 
replacement, cost $7.1B by 2035. 
• (90) Service craft cost $0.9B by 2035 (Assistant Secretary of the Navy Finance 
and Comptroller 2017). 
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APPENDIX M.  STAKEHOLDER QUESTIONNAIRE 
The Fleet Architecture of 2030–2035 has many stakeholders, each with different 
backgrounds of study, requirements interpretation, and methods to achieve those 
requirements. Stakeholder analysis helps understand stakeholder’s needs and concerns 
and uses that knowledge to make the final product successful. 
Stakeholder analysis serves a dual purpose. First, the stakeholders are the main 
source of information for determining the capability needs, system requirements, and 
constraints. Secondly, stakeholder analysis is done because we recognize our systems are 
developed for people, within the context of an organization, and collectively these people 
have enormous influence the success of the project. Any new system development 
implies change, consequently the program needs to conduct change management. 
Stakeholder analysis and engagement is part of the change management process and is 
done to ensure acceptance of the system (Giachetti, 2010). The following is a list of 
stakeholders and the questionnaire submitted for their feedback. 
 
I. U.S. Fleet Forces Command: ADM Phil Davidson 
 POCs: 
 Captain Robert Gamberg, USN, USFF N7 robert.gamberg@navy.mil 
Dr. William Reiske, USFF N8/9 william.reiske@navy.mil 
CAPT David Wickersham, USFF, N8/9  david.wickersham@navy.mil  
 
II. OPNAV (N9): 
 Cdr Kyle Gantt (Branch Head, Future Ships, OPNAV N96F3) 
 Tim Mierzwicki (Future Surface Combatant AoA) timothy.mierzwicki@navy.mil 
 Mr. Mike Novak, SES, OPNAV N9I B  michael.j.novak1@navy.mil 
 
III. Others: 
Mr William Glenny, Director Future Warfare Institute, glenneyw@usnwc.edu 
CAPT Kurt Sellerberg, Director, Distributed Lethality Task Force 
kurt.sellerberg@navy.mil 
Mr. David Yoshihara, SES, USPACFLT N00 David.Yoshihara@navy.mil 
Mr. Joseph Murphy, Director, Navy Warfare Development Command (NWDC), 
Joseph.murphy1@navy.mil 
CAPT Charles Good, NPS Surface Warfare Chair, cpgood@nps.edu 
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IV. Example Questionnaire: 
 
Disclaimer: The following questions are meant to be informative, based on U.S. Navy 
needs, and provide insight to our model’s assumptions. None of the information provided 
will be directly attributed to specific individuals. 
 
Definitions: Set-Based Design 
 
Our model defines a “set” as a possible future, and derives the requirements that 
the corresponding fleet architecture must have to meet the needs of that possible future. 
Some sets we are currently exploring are: 
 
Set 0:  Baseline, today’s fleet. 
Set 1:  Surface-Focused fleet based on Captain Wayne Hughes’ “A New Navy 
Fighting Machine” fleet design. 
Set 2:  Surface and Unmanned focused, with emphasis on South China Sea / 
Pacific Theater 
Set 3:  BMD focused. 
Set 4:  Green and Brown water focused. 
 
Data and Ratios 
 
Data points and ratios are derived to assess or constrain the different fleet 
architectures. In the absence of stakeholder input we will hypothesize these values. To 
the best of your ability, while maintaining this document unclassified, we request the 
following data points. 
  
For each numbered fleet’s Operational Area: 
 
● What is the minimum percentage that must be covered for SUW? 
● What is the minimum percentage that must be covered for AAW? 
● What is the minimum percentage that must be covered for BMD? 
 
For each numbered fleet, at any given time: 
 
● Of the total number of strike capable assets, what percentage is required to be 
deployed and underway? 
 
● Of the total number of ships, what percentage are required to be deployed and 
underway? 
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● Of the total number of nuclear submarines, what percentage are required to be 
deployed and underway? 
 
● Of your total number of amphibious ships what percentage are required to be 
deployed and underway? 
 
● In order to maintain amphibious operations, how many Marine-carrying Littoral 
Craft are required in each fleet? 
 
● In order to maintain sea control, how many mine-clearing vessels are required in 
your fleet? 
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APPENDIX N.  AREA CALCULATIONS 
The following AOR depictions are used in the calculation of weapon density 
(MOE 3), and derived from the hypothetical geographical locations of a given fleet’s 
Naval operations. Each graphic is derived from assumptions of the current numbered 
fleet’s expected AOR in the 2030–2035 timeframe. These area assumptions are derived 
for this study, however the areas can be refined by further analysis and outsider input.  
 
Figure 28.  Fleet Forces AOR. Source: Google Maps (2017) 




Figure 29.  4th Fleet AOR, South America. Source: Google Maps (2017). 
 
Figure 30.  5th Fleet AOR, Arabian Gulf. Source: Google Maps (2017). 




Figure 31.  5th Fleet AOR, Gulf of Oman. Source: Google Maps (2017). 
 
 
Figure 32.  6th Fleet AOR, Mediterranean Sea. Source: Google Maps (2017). 




Figure 33.  7th Fleet AOR, South China Sea. Source: Google Maps (2017). 
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APPENDIX O.  SHIP LIFE-CYCLE CONSIDERATIONS  
Table 8.   Commissioning and Decommissioning Dates of U.S. Navy Ships. 
Red Implies Scheduled Decommissioning Prior to 2035. Source: Naval 
Vessel Register (2017).  









staging base 10 July 1971 1 July 2006 
USS Pueblo AGER-2 Banner 
Technical 
research ship/
Spy ship 7 April 1945 29 March 1980 
USS Emory 



















































oga Cruiser 11 February 1989 3 February 2024 










oga Cruiser 16 June 1990 7 June 2025 
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oga Cruiser 22 June 2019 13 June 2054 
USS Chosin CG-65 
Ticonder






1991 5 September 2026 
USS Shiloh CG-67 
Ticonder
oga Cruiser 18 July 1992 10 July 2027 
USS Anzio CG-68 
Ticonder










oga Cruiser 10 May 1993 1 May 2028 
USS Cape 
St. George CG-71 
Ticonder
















Life    
USS Nimitz CVN-68 Nimitz Aircraft carrier 3 May 1975 20 April 2025 
USS Dwight 
D. 
Eisenhower CVN-69 Nimitz Aircraft carrier 18 October 1977 6 October 2027 
USS Carl 
Vinson CVN-70 Nimitz Aircraft carrier 13 March 1982 29 February 2032 
USS 
Theodore 
Roosevelt CVN-71 Nimitz Aircraft carrier 25 October 1986 12 October 2036 
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Lincoln CVN-72 Nimitz Aircraft carrier 
11 November 
1989 30 October 2039 
USS George 
Washington CVN-73 Nimitz Aircraft carrier 4 July 1992 22 June 2042 
USS John C. 




S. Truman CVN-75 Nimitz Aircraft carrier 25 July 1998 12 July 2048 
USS Ronald 
Reagan CVN-76 Nimitz Aircraft carrier 12 July 2003 29 June 2053 
USS George 




R. Ford CVN-78 
Gerald 




































































2010 4 November 2045 
   
 
 108 












































Burke Destroyer 4 July 1991 25 June 2026 




1992 4 December 2027 
USS John 








Burke Destroyer 19 March 1994 10 March 2029 
USS Stout DDG-55 
Arleigh 
Burke Destroyer 13 August 1994 4 August 2029 
USS John S. 
McCain DDG-56 
Arleigh 






1994 1 December 2029 
USS Laboon DDG-58 
Arleigh 
Burke Destroyer 18 March 1995 9 March 2030 
USS Russell DDG-59 
Arleigh 












Burke Destroyer 14 October 1995 5 October 2030 
USS DDG-63 Arleigh Destroyer 21 October 1995 12 October 2030 
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USS Carney DDG-64 
Arleigh 








Burke Destroyer 12 October 1996 4 October 2031 
USS Cole DDG-67 
Arleigh 




Burke Destroyer 19 April 1997 10 April 2032 











1997 28 August 2032 
USS Ross DDG-71 
Arleigh 
Burke Destroyer 28 June 1997 19 June 2032 
USS Mahan DDG-72 
Arleigh 
Burke Destroyer 14 February 1998 5 February 2033 
USS Decatur DDG-73 
Arleigh 
Burke Destroyer 29 August 1998 20 August 2033 
USS McFaul DDG-74 
Arleigh 




Burke Destroyer 4 December 1998 
25 November 
2033 
USS Higgins DDG-76 
Arleigh 
Burke Destroyer 24 April 1999 15 April 2034 
USS O’Kane DDG-77 
Arleigh 
Burke Destroyer 23 October 1999 14 October 2034 
USS Porter DDG-78 
Arleigh 








Burke Destroyer 14 October 2000 6 October 2035 
USS DDG-81 Arleigh Destroyer 10 March 2001 1 March 2036 
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USS Lassen DDG-82 
Arleigh 














Burke Destroyer 17 August 2002 8 August 2037 
USS Shoup DDG-86 
Arleigh 
Burke Destroyer 22 June 2002 13 June 2037 
USS Mason DDG-87 
Arleigh 
Burke Destroyer 12 April 2003 3 April 2038 




2002 31 October 2037 
USS Mustin DDG-89 
Arleigh 
Burke Destroyer 26 July 2003 17 July 2038 
USS Chafee DDG-90 
Arleigh 

















USS Nitze DDG-94 
Arleigh 
Burke Destroyer 5 March 2005 25 February 2040 
USS James 










2005 3 November 2040 
USS Halsey DDG-97 
Arleigh 




Burke Destroyer 28 January 2006 19 January 2041 
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Burke Destroyer 10 June 2006 1 June 2041 
USS Lewis 








































combat ship 16 January 2010 6 January 2050 
USS Fort 
Worth LCS-3 Freedom 
Littoral 






combat ship 27 January 2014 17 January 2054 
USS 











combat ship 5 December 2015 
25 November 
2055 
USS Detroit LCS-7 Freedom 
Littoral 








2016 31 August 2056 
USS 
America LHA-6 America 
Amphibious 
assault ship 11 October 2014 1 October 2054 
USS Wasp LHD-1 Wasp 
Amphibious 
assault ship 6 July 1989 26 June 2029 
USS Essex LHD-2 Wasp 
Amphibious 
assault ship 24 August 1992 14 August 2032 
USS 
Kearsarge LHD-3 Wasp 
Amphibious 
assault ship 16 October 1993 6 October 2033 
USS Boxer LHD-4 Wasp Amphibious 11 February 1995 1 February 2035 
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Richard LHD-6 Wasp 
Amphibious 
assault ship 15 August 1998 5 August 2038 
USS Iwo 
Jima LHD-7 Wasp 
Amphibious 
assault ship 30 June 2001 20 June 2041 
USS Makin 
Island LHD-8 Wasp 
Amphibious 


























































transport dock 1 March 2014 19 February 2054 


























ship 8 August 1987 26 July 2039 
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ship 3 February 1990 22 January 2039 
















































ship 27 April 1998 17 April 2039 
USS Warrior MCM-10 Avenger 
Mine 
countermeasur
es ship 7 April 1993 31 March 2023 
USS 








USS Ardent MCM-12 Avenger 
Mine 
countermeasur
es ship 18 February 1994 11 February 2024 
USS 
Dextrous MCM-13 Avenger 
Mine 
countermeasur
es ship 9 July 1994 1 July 2024 





1994 28 October 2024 





1989 26 August 2019 
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Champion MCM-4 Avenger 
Mine 
countermeasur
es ship 8 February 1991 31 January 2021 
USS 
Devastator MCM-6 Avenger 
Mine 
countermeasur
es ship 6 October 1990 
28 September 
2020 
USS Patriot MCM-7 Avenger 
Mine 
countermeasur
es ship 18 October 1991 10 October 2021 





1990 7 December 2020 
USS Pioneer MCM-9 Avenger 
Mine 
countermeasur







frigates Classic frigate 1 October 1797 
28 September 
1812 
USS Firebolt PC-10 Cyclone Patrol boat 10 June 1995 6 June 2010 
USS 
Whirlwind PC-11 Cyclone Patrol boat 1 July 1995 27 June 2010 
USS 
Thunderbolt PC-12 Cyclone Patrol boat 7 October 1995 3 October 2010 
USS Shamal PC-13 Cyclone Patrol boat 27 January 1996 23 January 2011 
USS 
Tornado PC-14 Cyclone Patrol boat 24 June 2000 21 June 2015 
USS 
Tempest PC-2 Cyclone Patrol boat 21 August 1993 17 August 2008 
USS 
Hurricane PC-3 Cyclone Patrol boat 15 October 1993 11 October 2008 
USS 
Monsoon PC-4 Cyclone Patrol boat 22 January 1994 18 January 2009 
USS 
Typhoon PC-5 Cyclone Patrol boat 12 February 1994 8 February 2009 
USS Sirocco PC-6 Cyclone Patrol boat 11 June 1994 7 June 2009 
USS Squall PC-7 Cyclone Patrol boat 4 July 1994 30 June 2009 
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USS Zephyr PC-8 Cyclone Patrol boat 15 October 1994 11 October 2009 
USS 























































































missile 29 July 1995 18 July 2037 
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submarine 11 February 1984 31 January 2026 
USS 
Seawolf SSN-21 Seawolf 
Attack 
submarine 19 July 1997 11 July 2030 
USS 




1998 3 December 2031 
USS Jimmy 
Carter SSN-23 Seawolf 
Attack 




























































submarine 9 July 1988 1 July 2021 
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1986 31 October 2019 























submarine 11 February 1989 3 February 2022 




submarine 7 April 1990 30 March 2023 

























































submarine 8 January 1994 
31 December 
2026 












submarine 13 March 1993 5 March 2026 
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1994 2 December 2027 




submarine 24 February 1995 16 February 2028 


























1996 5 September 2029 
USS 
Virginia SSN-774 Virginia 
Attack 
submarine 23 October 2004 15 October 2037 




2006 1 September 2039 
USS Hawaii SSN-776 Virginia 
Attack 
submarine 5 May 2007 26 April 2040 
USS North 
Carolina SSN-777 Virginia 
Attack 
submarine 3 May 2008 25 April 2041 
USS New 
Hampshire SSN-778 Virginia 
Attack 
submarine 25 October 2008 17 October 2041 
USS New 
Mexico SSN-779 Virginia 
Attack 
submarine 27 March 2010 19 March 2043 
USS 
Missouri SSN-780 Virginia 
Attack 
submarine 31 July 2010 23 July 2043 
USS 
California SSN-781 Virginia 
Attack 
submarine 29 October 2011 20 October 2044 
USS 
Mississippi SSN-782 Virginia 
Attack 
submarine 2 June 2012 25 May 2045 
USS 




2013 30 August 2046 
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Dakota SSN-784 Virginia 
Attack 
submarine 25 October 2014 17 October 2047 
USS John 
Warner SSN-785 Virginia 
Attack 
submarine 1 August 2015 23 July 2048 
USS Illinois SSN-786 Virginia 
Attack 
submarine 29 October 2016 21 October 2049 
 
Table 9.   U.S. Navy Ships Under Construction or Planned. Source: Naval 
Vessel Register (2017). 
Vermont (SSN 792) (SSN 792)  Construction began May 2014 
Oregon (SSN 793) Construction began September 2014 
Montana (SSN 794) Construction began April 2015 
Hyman G. Rickover (SSN 795) Construction began September 2015 
New Jersey (SSN 796) Construction began March 2016 
Iowa (SSN 797) Construction began September 2016 
Massachusetts (SSN 798) Construction began March 2017 
Idaho (SSN 799) Under contract 
Arkansas (SSN 800) Under contract 
Utah (SSN 801) Under contract 
PCU Ralph Johnson (DDG 114), Under construction 
PCU Thomas Hudner (DDG 116) Under construction 
PCU Paul Ignatius (DDG 117) Under construction 
PCU Daniel Inouye (DDG 118) Under construction 
PCU Delbert D. Black (DDG 119) Under construction 
PCU Carl M. Levin (DDG 120) Under construction 
PCU Frank E. Petersen, 
Jr. (DDG 121) Under construction 
John Basilone (DDG 122) Pre-construction 
Lenah H. Sutcliffe Higbee (DDG 123) Pre-construction 
Harvey C. Barnum, Jr. (DDG 124) Pre-construction 
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PCU Michael Monsoor (DDG 1001) Under construction 
PCU Lyndon B. Johnson (DDG 1002) Under construction 
   
 
 121 
LIST OF REFERENCES 
Assistant Secretary of the Navy Finance and Comptroller. 2017. Highlights of the 
Department of Navy FY 2018 Budget. 18-PRES. Washington, DC: Department of 
the Navy. http://www.secnav.navy.mil/fmc/fmb/Documents/18pres/
Highlights_book.pdf 
Bradley, Cayle, Joanne Daniel, Daniel Hanks, and Joanmarie McKelvey.  2009. UAV 
Mothership. Report No. NSWCDD-CISD-2009/004. West Bethesda, MD: Naval 
Surface Warfare Center, Carterock Division. http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/
u2/a518429.pdf 
 Clark, Bryan, and Jesse Sloman. 2016. Advancing Beyond the Beach: Amphibious 
Operations in an Era of Precision Weapons. Washington, DC: Center for Strategy 
and Budgetary Assessments. http://csbaonline.org/uploads/documents/
CSBA6216-AmphibiousWarfare_Final3-web.pdf 
Department of the Navy. 2015. A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower. 
Washington, DC: Government Printing Office. http://www.navy.mil/local/
maritime/150227-CS21R-Final.pdf 
Department of the Navy. 2016. A Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority. 
Washington, DC: Government Printing Office. http://www.navy.mil/cno/docs/
cno_stg.pdf. 
Drozeski, Graham. 2017. “TERN.” DARPA. https://www.darpa.mil/program/tern 
Eckstein, Megan. 2017. “Navy Accelerating Work on ‘Snakehead’ Large Displacement 
Unmanned Underwater Vehicle.” USNI News. April 4, 2017. 
https://news.usni.org/2017/04/04/navy-splits-lduuv-into-rapid-acquisition-
program-at-peo-lcs-rd-effort-at-onr 
Freebird, Sydney. 2017. “Navy Railgun Ramps Up in Test Shots.” Breaking Defense. 
May 19, 2017. https://breakingdefense.com/2017/05/navy-railgun-ramps-up-in-
test-shots/ 
Giachetti, Ronald. 2010. Design of Engineering Enterprise Systems: Theory, 
Architecture, and Methods. Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press.  
Google Maps. 2017. “Various.” Accessed 24 September, 2017. https://www.google.com/
maps/@21.2665638,104.821253,3z  
Honan, William. 1984. “Return of the Battleship.” New York Times Magazine. April 4, 
1984. http://www.nytimes.com/1982/04/04/magazine/return-of-the-
battleships.html?pagewanted=all 
   
 
 122 
Hughes, Wayne. 2009. “A New Navy Fighting Machine: A Study of the Connections 
between Contemporary Policy, Strategy, Sea Power, Naval Operations, and the 
Composition of the United States Fleet.” Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate 
School. 
Kline, Jeffery. 2017. “Memorandum for Systems Engineering Analysis Cohort 26 (SEA-
26).” Official Memorandum. Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School. 
Knowles, Kevin. 2016. Littoral Combat Ship Mission Package Data Sheet. 1B-5830MS-
BP-05-16-75266. McClellan Park, CA. Northrup Grumman Systems Corporation. 
MITRE Corporation. 2016. Navy Future Fleet Platform Architecture Study. McLean, 
VA:  The MITRE Corporation. https://www.mccain.senate.gov/public/_cache/
files/1a3e3a4e-6c97-42fb-bec5-a482cf4d4d85/mintre-navy-future-fleet-platform-
architecture-study.pdf  
Naval Vessel Register. 2017. Fleet Size. Portsmouth, VA: NAVSEA Shipbuilding 
Support Office. http://www.nvr.navy.mil/NVRSHIPS/
ACTIVEINCOMMISSION.HTML   
O’Rourke, Ronald. 2017. Navy Ford (CVN-78) Class Aircraft Carrier Program: 
Background and Issues for Congress. CRS Report No. RS20643. Washington, 
DC: Congressional Research Service. https://fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/
RS20643.pdf 
PMS-420. 2017. Littoral Combat Ship Mission Modules. SAS-103. Washington, DC. 
NAVSEA. http://www.navsea.navy.mil/Portals/103/Documents/Exhibits/SAS-
Moton-LCSMM.pdf 
Singer, David, Norbert Doerry, and Michael Buckley. 2009. “What is Set-Based 
Design?” ASNE Naval Engineers Journal 121, no. 4. http://www.doerry.org/
norbert/papers/SBDFinal.pdf 
Stackley, Sean. and Thomas Rowden. Littoral Combat Ship: Hearing Before the House 
Armed Service Committee Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigation, House 
of Representatives, 114th Congress. 1 (2016). Retrieved from 
http://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS06/20161208/105447/HHRG-114-AS06-
Wstate-StackleyS-20161208.pdf  
Stille, Mark. 2014. The Imperial Japanese Navy in the Pacific War. Oxford: Osprey 
Publishing. 
U.S. Army UAS Center for Excellence. 2010. Eyes of the Army: U.S. Army Roadmap For 
UAS 2010–2035. ATZQ-CDI-C. Fort Rucker, AL. Army UAS Center for 
Excellence. http://www.rucker.army.mil/usaace/uas/
US%20Army%20UAS%20RoadMap%202010%202035.pdf 
   
 
 123 
U.S. Fleet Forces Command. 2014. Optimized Fleet Response Plan. 
COMUSFLTFORCOM 3000.15A. Norfolk, VA: U.S. Fleet Forces Command. 




Walan, Alexander. 2017. “Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) Continuous Trail Unmanned 
Vessel (ACTUV).” DARPA. https://www.darpa.mil/program/anti-submarine-
warfare-continuous-trail-unmanned-vessel 
  
   
 
 124 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
  
   
 
 125 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
 Ft. Belvoir, Virginia 
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
 Naval Postgraduate School 
 Monterey, California 
 
